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 The mission of the South Carolina Department of Administration (Admin) is: “Lead to 
identify efficiencies. Collaborate to provide services to enhance security and trust. Innovate to 
increase effectiveness.”1 To fulfill this mission, Admin’s Office of Technology and Information 
Services (OTIS) “provides strategic direction and guidance for the delivery of technology, 
security, and privacy-related services and solutions to governmental entities.” 2 As a member of 
OTIS’s Enterprise Privacy Office (EPO), the author “advises State agencies on the management 
of personal information,” and works “to establish, assess, and enhance privacy protection policy, 
training, and compliance measures.”3  
The purpose of this paper is to examine a statewide privacy compliance challenge 
relating to the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. The following exploratory 
analysis represents the opinions of the author, not necessarily those of his agency or office, and is 
intended to spark a statewide conversation on economic and regulatory opportunities in the field 
of data protection and the steps needed to realize them. 
Problem Statement 
On May 25, 2018 the European Union (EU)’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)4 concerning privacy of personal information entered into effect. Widely considered to 
be a more stringent regulation than any other jurisdiction’s laws, the GDPR both created 
                                                          
1 SC Department of Administration web site. https://admin.sc.gov/. Accessed 8 Jan 2019. 
2 SC Department of Administration web site. https://www.admin.sc.gov/executive-director. Accessed 18 Dec 2018. 
3 SC Department of Administration, Enterprise Privacy Office web site. 
https://www.admin.sc.gov/technology/enterprise-privacy/about-enterprise-privacy. Accessed 18 Dec 2018. 
4 “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).” http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj. 
Accessed 18 Dec 2018. 
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compliance obligations for organizations that collect or process personal data and enumerated 
enforceable rights that individuals may exercise to exert control over the use of information 
relating to themselves. While a full description of the GDPR’s requirements are beyond the 
scope of this paper, examples of compliance challenges for organizations include: 
• Developing the capability to respond to individuals’ requests to access, edit, or even, 
depending on the circumstances, delete personal data; 
• Utilizing a prescribed “Data Protection Impact Assessment” to analyze the sensitivity 
of data or the risk of harm to an individual if the data was used in an inappropriate or 
unauthorized way; and 
• Implementing information security controls proportionate to the sensitivity, including 
notifying regulators of data breaches within seventy-two hours of becoming aware. 
EU lawmakers and regulators consider the GDPR’s reach to extend beyond the borders of 
EU Member States. According to their interpretation, any organization collecting or processing 
data relating to any of the half-billion EU residents must comply with the GDPR. As one of its 
requirements, organizations are restricted from transferring personal data outside of the EU, 5 
since other countries are presumed not to sufficiently respect, protect, or enforce the privacy 
rights of individuals.  
Due to extensive exchanges in trade, travel, tourism, and residency amongst South 
Carolina and European citizens, such a restriction could have a dramatic effect on the economic 
prosperity and effective government operations in the state.6 Data transfers would still be 
                                                          
5 GDPR Ibid. Article 44: General principles for transfers. 
6 Note: As with many aspects of the law that have not yet been clarified by regulators, GDPR’s direct applicability 
to US state government entities is debatable. Like any other type of organization, a government entity operating 
entirely outside the EU is considered to be outside the scope of EU law. However, any organization that targets EU 
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possible, but would involve each organization undergoing a regulatory review of their 
procedures7 or determining an exception that applies to the specific situation.8 
As another option for data transfers, the EU established a political process in which 
jurisdictions are evaluated to determine whether their respect for and protection of privacy as a 
fundamental human right is “Adequate,” or equivalent to the EU’s.9 While these adequacy 
determinations existed under previous regulations, the GDPR explicitly contemplates the 
possibility that sub-national territories or even industry sectors may be approved.10 
This paper will examine the components of an adequacy decision and apply the logic to 
South Carolina’s environment to determine the legal or regulatory gap, if any, between South 
Carolina and jurisdictions deemed adequate as well as what steps may be needed to close any 
gaps. A statewide adequacy decision would have effects beyond state agency compliance issues: 
it would allow South Carolina businesses to seamlessly offer goods and services to the European 
market. An adequacy determination would establish the state as one of the most attractive US 
bases of operation for European companies and enable South Carolina to promote business 
opportunities and job growth. 
Data Analysis 
 A dozen countries, including the United States (US) to a limited extent, have been 
granted an adequacy decision by the European Commission, the executive body of the EU.11 
                                                          
residents could theoretically trigger GDPR compliance requirements. For more on this topic, see Appendix, “Will 
GDPR Impact States and Localities?” (www.GovTech.com). 
7 GDPR Ibid. Article 47: Binding corporate rules. 
8 GDPR Ibid. Article 48: Derogations for specific situations. 
9 GDPR Ibid. Article 45: Transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision. 
10 GDPR ibid. Article 45(3). 
11 “The European Commission has so far recognised Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organisations), Faroe 
Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay and the United States of 
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While these decisions were made by gauging the countries’ compliance with GDPR’s 
predecessor, the Data Protection Directive,12 the logic proves illustrative, particularly when 
examining evaluations of the United States’ legal environment. In addition, the Commission has 
recently engaged with Japan and South Korea to discuss an adequacy decision; the products of 
these dialogues provide additional insight into critical factors. 
Elements for Adequacy 
In Article 45(2), GDPR outlines three elements in the test by which the Commission 
examines potential territories for whether they provide an adequate level of protection. They are: 
a) “the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant 
legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, 
national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal 
data, as well as the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, 
professional rules and security measures, including rules for the onward transfer of 
personal data to another third country or international organization…, case-law, as 
well as effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and 
judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data are being transferred; 
b) “the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory 
authorities in the third country…, with responsibility for ensuring and enforcing 
compliance with the data protection rules, including adequate enforcement powers, 
                                                          
America (limited to the Privacy Shield framework) as providing adequate protection.” European Commission web 
site. https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-
personal-data-non-eu-countries_en. Accessed 18 Dec 2018. 
12 “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.” 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1995/46/oj. Accessed 18 Dec 2018.  
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for assisting and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for 
cooperation with the supervisory authorities of the Member States; and 
c) “the international commitments the third country or international organisation 
concerned has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding 
conventions or instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional 
systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data.” 
EU-US Privacy Shield 
 Despite historical disagreements over the approach to data protection laws and 
regulations, due to the importance of the trade relationship between the US and EU the two 
parties have persisted in finding solutions to allow international data transfers. While there have 
rarely been concerns about the adequacy of US rule of law, approval of US adequacy has turned 
on issues of public authorities’ access to personal data and the functioning of effective and 
independent regulatory authorities. For example, after revelations by national security contractor 
Edward Snowden that the US government engaged in national security data collection practices 
more broadly than commonly understood, the European Court of Justice invalidated the EU-US 
Safe Harbor framework, ending the most common legal basis for data transfers.13  
The US and EU negotiated a replacement, the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework, a set of 
agreements and promises by the US executive branch that the European Commission 
subsequently deemed adequate protection of privacy rights.14 As part of the agreement, the 
Commission will conduct annual evaluations of US compliance with commitments.  
                                                          
13 “PRESS RELEASE No 106/15, Court of Justice of the European Union. Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-
362/14.” https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-09/cp150106en.pdf. Accessed 19 Dec 
2018. 
14 Privacy Shield Framework web site. https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome. Accessed 19 Dec 2018. 
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In its second annual review in 2018, Privacy Shield was approved to continue for another 
cycle.15 The Commission noted US efforts to resolve concerns relating to national security data 
collection, including reauthorization of critical sections of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act and introduction of “some limited additional privacy safeguards, for instance in the area of 
transparency.”16 The Commission also positively cited strong oversight of government activities 
via the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and of the private sector via enforcement 
“mechanisms to detect potential compliance issues, such as random spot-checks[,]…the 
monitoring of public reports about the privacy practices of Privacy Shield participants[, and] 
using a variety of tools” to identify false claims of participation by organizations.17  
The Commission’s main concerns and recommendations18 for this cycle are that:  
• US regulators continue to “proactively monitor compliance,” detect false claims, and 
collaborate with EU authorities on points of clarification.  
• The government appoints a permanent and effective Ombudsperson to receive and 
resolve complaints. 
• The US adopt as a legal model a comprehensive regulatory system and join 
international privacy agreements such as Council of Europe’s Convention 108.19 
                                                          
15 See Appendix, “REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the 
second annual review of the functioning of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.” 19 Dec 2018.  
16 Ibid. Page 4. 
17 Ibid. Pages 2-3. 
18 Ibid. Page 5-6. 
19 Note: The current US regulatory framework consist of “sectoral” laws that apply to certain industries and “self-
regulatory” standards voluntarily adopted by industries or individual organizations. An example of a sectoral law 
would be the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which has a limited scope and 
applies primarily to healthcare providers. An example of a self-regulatory system is the Payment Card Institute 
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), which is a set of rules created by credit card companies and enforced through 
contract. The EU-US Privacy Shield has elements of a self-regulatory system, in that organizations comply by 
choice, but the framework has been given the force of law for those who do so choose (“co-regulatory”). In the EU 




 Throughout 2018, the EU and Japan have engaged in talks to establish mutual recognition 
of adequacy as part of a larger free trade deal. These discussions, which still await a final 
decision, are noteworthy in that they involve the first application of GDPR standards for 
adequacy to a new territory.  
 As with the Privacy Shield discussions, EU authorities negotiated commitments from the 
government beyond the standard data protection laws of the country. Since the Japanese privacy 
regulator enshrined these commitments as “legally binding rules, any rights and obligations are 
enforceable … in the same way as the provisions of the Act that they supplement with stricter 
and/or more detailed rules.”20 The rules added, among other matters, specificity regarding 
special categories of data that are considered more sensitive, organizations’ obligations regarding 
identification and communication of the purpose for data collection, and the circumstances in 
which it would be permissible to transfer data that relates to EU residents outside of Japan. 
 As part of the adequacy decision-making process, a group of EU privacy regulators called 
the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), provides an opinion to guide the Commission. In 
its Opinion 28/2018,21 the EDPB cites concerns relating to:  
• the patchwork nature of combining the privacy law with Supplementary Rules. The 
EDPB seeks clarity about the legally binding status of the rules;22 
                                                          
regardless of industry. For more, see: Swire, Peter P., and Kenesa Ahmad. Foundations of Information Privacy and 
Data Protection: A Survey of Global Concepts, Laws and Practices. Edited by Terry McQuay, IAPP, 2012. p. 29-45. 
20 See Appendix, “Annex I: Supplementary Rules under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information for the 
Handling of Personal Data Transferred from the EU based on an Adequacy Decision.” Page 2. 
21 See Appendix, “Opinion of the Board (Art. 70.I.s), Opinion 28/2018 regarding the European Commission Draft 
Implementing Decision on the adequate protection of personal data in Japan.” 
22 Ibid. Paragraphs 12-13. 
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• the ability of the Japanese regulator to determine third countries that will be 
considered adequate from a Japanese perspective, creating the risk of a data funneling 
from the EU in unanticipated ways;23 
• consent as a basis for processing in the Japanese legal system and for transfers to 
third countries, since “the information given to the EU data subject prior to 
consenting seems not to be comprehensive;”24 
• the ability of Europeans to access the Japanese legal or redress system due to sole 
Japanese language availability for regulatory guidance. The EDPB would “welcome 
… an online service, at least in English”;25 and 
• law enforcement and national security redress and oversight mechanisms, as well as 
the ability of the EDPB to conduct a thorough review of these mechanisms due to the 
unavailability of translations of legal and court documents.26 
As of December 2018, the concerns raised by the EDPB and other parties indicate that 
“further clarifications,” or another round of discussions, may be needed before a final decision.27 
South Korea 
 South Korea and the EU began adequacy talks in 2015 prior to the creation of the GDPR, 
but European concerns about effective and independent regulators have prevented approval of 
the country to date. As cited above, Article 45(2)(b) of the GDPR states that regulatory 
authorities must have three characteristics. They must be:  
                                                          
23 Ibid. Paragraph 17. 
24 Ibid. Paragraphs 18, 98. 
25 Ibid. Paragraph 29. 
26 Ibid. Paragraph 27 and Section 4. 
27 “Japan's long road for adequacy under the GDPR.” https://iapp.org/news/a/japans-long-road-for-adequacy-
under-the-gdpr/. Accessed 20 Dec. 2018. 
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“independent supervisory authorities,” not a part of the political government, “with 
responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules, 
including adequate enforcement powers…” [emphasis added] 
In South Korea “multiple government agencies play supplemental roles” with 
complementary or overlapping supervisory authority. 28 The Personal Information Protection 
Commission (PIPC) is an independent authority with supervision over the comprehensive 
privacy law but without enforcement powers; those powers are actually held by the Ministry of 
the Interior and Safety (MOIS).29 There is an entity that arguably meets all three requirements, 
the Korean Communications Commission (KCC), but its powers are limited to supervising the 
broadcasting and communications sector. The KCC consists of two commissioners “directly 
appointed by the President …[and] three are nominated by the National Assembly.”30 
Table 1: 
Entity Independent? Responsibility? Enforcement Powers? 
PIPC Yes Yes, most organizations No 
MOIS No Yes, most organizations Yes 




                                                          
28 “Structure and Enforcement of Data Privacy Law in South Korea.” Brussels Privacy Hub Working Paper Vol. 2. No. 
7. October 2016.  
29 Ministry of the Interior and Safety web site. https://www.privacy.go.kr/eng/about_us.do. Accessed 28 Dec 2018. 
30 Korea Communications Commission web site. https://eng.kcc.go.kr/user.do?page=E01010100&dc=E01010100. 
Accessed 28 Dec 2018. 
10 
 
While the country considered an adequacy application limited to only the Broadcasting 
and Communications sector, instead legislators sought to remedy the regulatory gaps in 
independence and powers.31 A newly proposed law from November 2018 will combine the 
enforcement powers of MOIS and KCC and grant them to the PIPC. Commentators state that 
after such a change, “South Korea will be in a good position to obtain an EU adequacy 
decision.”32 
South Carolina 
 The Constitution of South Carolina enshrines privacy as a fundamental right. The 
Declaration of Rights33 Article I, Section 10 protects “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
unreasonable invasions of privacy”. Article I, Section 2 prohibits the state legislature from, 
among other matters, “bridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government or any department thereof for a redress of 
grievances.” In addition, the Declaration of Rights contains protections relating to due process34 
and the rule of law,35 seizure of private property,36 judicial review of administrative agencies,37 
and the rights of victims.38 
                                                          
31 “South Korea's EU adequacy decision rests on new legislative proposals.” https://iapp.org/news/a/south-koreas-
eu-adequacy-decision-rests-on-new-legislative-proposals/. Accessed 20 Dec 2018. 
32 “Proposed Changes to South Korea’s Personal Information Protection Act.” 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/proposed-changes-to-south-korea-s-96538/. Accessed 20 Dec 2018. 
33 See Appendix, ARTICLE I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. 
34 Ibid. Article I, Section 3: Privileges and immunities; due process; equal protection of laws. 
35 Ibid. Article I, Section 9: Courts; speedy remedy. 
36 Ibid. Article I, Section 13: Taking private property; economic development; remedy of blight. 
37 Ibid. Article I, Section 22: Procedure before administrative agencies; judicial review. 
38 Ibid. Article I, Section 24: Victims’ Bill of Rights. 
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In the South Carolina legal environment, organizations including state government 
entities must comply with US federal regulations, such as sectoral laws related to privacy and 
credit reporting. In addition, like most US states South Carolina has focused its own privacy 
regulation on issues surrounding data breaches, a subset of data protection. Through a variety of 
laws, regulations, and legislative provisos, both private and public sector entities are required to 
notify regulators and affected individuals in the event of a data beach.39 State agencies face 
additional privacy and cybersecurity compliance requirements related to their business practices 
that are developed by the Department of Administration.40 
 Several agencies play a role in privacy regulation and oversight.41 While some federal 
privacy laws delegate powers to state Attorneys General, South Carolina laws empower the 
Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) to regulate data breach notification obligations.42 The 
Attorney General is an elected position, and DCA is an administrative agency governed by a 
commission “composed of nine members, one of whom is the [elected] Secretary of State. Of the 
remaining eight members, the General Assembly elects four other members from outside the 
legislature and the Governor appoints four members whose appointments are confirmed by the 
Senate.”43 In addition, the mission of the SC Office of Ombudsman is “to appropriately refer any 
                                                          
39 SC Code Ann. Sec. 39-1-90 Breach of security of business data; SC Code Ann. Sec. 1-11-490 Breach of security of 
state agency data; SC Code Ann. Sec. 30-2-10, et seq. Family Privacy Protection Act; SC Code Ann. Sec. 30-2-310 et 
seq. Personal Identifying Information Privacy Protection; SC Legislature 2018-2019 Appropriations Bill as Ratified 
by the General Assembly on June 29, 2018, Proviso 117.105 Data Breach Notification. (Note: Proviso numbers may 
change with each annual budget bill.) 
40 SC Legislature 2018-2019 Appropriations Bill as Ratified by the General Assembly on June 29, 2018, Proviso 93.20 
Cyber Security; Proviso 117.112 Information Technology and Information Security Plans. (Note: Proviso numbers 
may change with each annual budget bill.) 
41 Note: As in other US states, the Department of Insurance regulates the insurance industry. In 2018, the South 
Carolina Insurance Data Security Act (SC Code Ann. Sec 38-99-10 et seq.) empowered the agency to regulate 
insurance organizations’ cybersecurity and privacy programs. While this paper focuses on a statewide adequacy 
decision, the insurance industry could provide an interesting case study for a sectoral adequacy evaluation. 
42 Inter alia, SC Code Ann. Sec. 39-1-90(H), (K); Sec. 1-11-490(H), (I); Proviso 117.105(G), (H). 




question, concern, or request a citizen might have[,]…accurately and efficiently navigating South 
Carolinians to the proper state agency or resource equipped to handle their needs.”44  
Implementation Plan 
 To achieve an adequacy determination, South Carolina must address the faults found in 
other countries’ frameworks within the context of GDPR Article 45(2). As state subject matter 
experts on privacy, the Enterprise Privacy Office stands in prime position to support state 
agencies, legislators, and other stakeholders to evaluate and prepare an adequacy effort. 
Rule of Law 
The EU-US Privacy Shield negotiations and evaluations indicate that rule of law is, in 
large part, not an issue for US jurisdictions. Even examination of national security operations, 
beyond the legal control of South Carolina legislation and regulation, received a favorable 
opinion in the second annual Privacy Shield review. EU criticisms on this front focused on the 
perceived need for a permanent and effective federal Ombudsperson and the lack of a 
comprehensive regulatory system.  
South Carolina should undertake a study to cross-reference the duties of the requested 
federal Ombudsperson with existing state oversight bodies. This study may find that the 
combined work of the Office of Ombudsman, Department of Consumer Affairs, and potential 
other groups already provide the appropriate level of governmental oversight. 
South Carolina should investigate the benefits and detriments of implementing a 
comprehensive privacy regulation. While such regulations are rare in the US, they are not 
                                                          
44 SC Office of Ombudsman web site. http://ombudsman.sc.gov/. Accessed 27 Dec 2018. 
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without precedent and occur more frequently in other countries. The California Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2018,45 signed into law June 2018, created privacy rights for California 
residents and compliance obligations for businesses similar to those in the GDPR. In addition, 
several Canadian provinces46 and Australian states47 have passed comprehensive legislation at 
the state government level. This comprehensive law should consider carefully the definition of 
what is considered personal data and what elements would be considered sensitive data 
deserving even greater protection. 
If a decision is made to forego a comprehensive law, South Carolina should investigate 
steps needed to achieve the effect through laws or regulations supplementing existing law. 
Solutions may include executive orders in lieu of legislative action, or a legislative authorization 
for regulatory rule-making authority for data privacy issues concerning foreign nationals. 
However, as the evaluations of Japanese adequacy have shown, these supplementary rules may 
cause lingering doubt that could delay or prevent a favorable final decision. 
EU criticisms of the Japanese framework also raised concerns regarding the onward 
transfer of data to other jurisdictions. South Carolina may be limited in the extent to which the 
state may prohibit such transfers within the US. The state should investigate whether doing so 
would be permitted under the US Constitution’s interstate commerce provisions. If a prohibition 
is not possible, the state should investigate how to achieve the desired consumer protection in the 
alternative, perhaps by requiring that businesses with EU customers limit data transfers to only 
                                                          
45 California Assembly Bill No. 375. TITLE 1.81.5. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 [1798.100 - 1798.199]. 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375. Accessed 27 Dec 2018.  
46 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada web site. “Summary of privacy laws in Canada.” 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/02_05_d_15/. Accessed 27 Dec 2018. 
47 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner web site. “Other privacy jurisdictions.” 




Privacy Shield organizations or that any transfer must nevertheless meet all promises made to the 
consumer in that (or any other) regard. 
As part of any new privacy law, the state should evaluate the use of consent as a method 
for organizations to collect and use data. Concerns raised by the EDPB in their examination of 
Japan indicate that consent as a legal process may prove difficult to justify, since individuals 
must receive comprehensive information on data use and transfer for the consent to be valid. 
South Carolina should investigate the extent to which consent as a legal basis for data processing 
may be unwieldy to legislate for and regulate. 
Effective and Independent Supervision 
 As part of any new legislation or regulation developed, South Carolina must examine 
what steps may be needed to ensure privacy regulation is effective and independent. As the 
South Korea example illustrates, for adequacy the EU desires that regulatory authorities have 
independence, responsibility for enforcing compliance, and enforcement powers. South Korea 
chose to address its issues by consolidating enforcement power, and South Carolina should 
evaluate whether such a course would prove effective. As part of this evaluation, South Carolina 
should consider whether either or both of the elected Attorney General or DCA oversight 
commission are sufficiently independent according to the EU standards and definitions.  
 Under current data breach legislation, privacy violations are only discovered after the 
breach is self-reported. Based on EU criticisms of Privacy Shield, to achieve compliance South 
Carolina should ensure that privacy laws and regulations include oversight that is a proactive 
monitoring of compliance. South Carolina should also develop mechanisms for domestic 
regulators to collaborate with EU regulators on enforcement issues. 
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 Since South Carolina government operates in English, concerns about European access to 
the legal or redress system are lesser than those expressed regarding Japan. Still, South Carolina 
should consider whether to add to online regulatory guidance any additional European languages 
that may also be spoken in the state. 
Legally binding international agreements 
The EU recommends that the US join the Council of Europe’s Convention 108, a binding 
privacy treaty. South Carolina should investigate whether the commitments of Convention 108 
match with existing state policies and constitutional protections and whether, if it so chose, the 
state may participate in an international agreement, including as an observer. In addition, South 
Carolina should investigate opportunities for state privacy regulators to participate in 
international associations and collaborative bodies. 
Evaluation Method 
 Perhaps the best gauge of these recommendations’ success would be the simple binary of 
whether South Carolina successfully achieves an adequacy status or not. Short of that, a variety 
of stakeholders will need to collaborate to translate the recommended assessments into specific 
steps. Privacy, legal, regulatory, and legislative expert evaluations and opinions can help 
determine whether these suggestions close the gap between current state and GDPR adequacy. 
 Importantly, adequacy with GDPR does not necessarily mean being identical to GDPR. 
Reviews such as the Privacy Shield’s show that jurisdictions may take alternative approaches. As 
the EDPB predecessor group stated:  
“while the ‘level of protection’ in the third country must be ‘essentially equivalent’ to 
that guaranteed in the EU, ‘the means to which that third country has recourse, in this 
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connection, for the purpose of such a level of protection may differ from those employed 
within the [EU]’. Therefore, the objective is not to mirror point by point the European 
legislation, but to establish the essential – core requirements of that legislation.’”48  
Even without an adequacy determination, South Carolina could realize and measure the 
benefits of proactive and comprehensive privacy regulation through increased European business 
interactions and improved economic well-being for state residents.  
Summary and Recommendations 
To summarize, this report recommends the following steps: 
• Identify plan of action and timelines for an internal South Carolina evaluation of 
adequacy actions, with the Enterprise Privacy Office supporting stakeholders as 
subject-matter experts; 
• Analyze the position of Privacy Shield Ombudsperson to ensure that South Carolina 
government oversight is comparable (include Office of Ombudsman, Department of 
Consumer Affairs, etc.); 
• Investigate comprehensive privacy regulation, using lessons learned from the 
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, and alternatives such as supplementary 
rules for regulators;  
• Investigate to what extent South Carolina may prohibit onward transfers and what 
alternative actions would meet the spirit of the prohibition;  
• Evaluate the use of consent as a justification for organizations to collect and use data, 
and develop an alternative legal framework for data management;  
                                                          
48 See Appendix, Article 29 Working Party Adequacy Referential 18/EN WP 254 rev.01. Chapter 1, paragraph 2. 
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• Examine potential actions to consolidate enforcement power, and develop a position 
statement on the independence of state regulators;  
• Develop mechanisms for domestic regulators to collaborate with EU regulators on 
enforcement issues; 
• Study impact of adding additional European languages to online regulatory guidance; 
• Investigate and develop a policy regarding international participation in or 
observation of privacy treaties and regulatory groups; and  
• Develop an engagement strategy on how best to begin adequacy discussions with 
European Union leadership. The adequacy negotiations may be a time-consuming 
process, all the more so since South Carolina’s would be a trail-blazing sub-national 
application.  
Naturally, once any or all of these recommended actions have been taken, the state should 
examine the results and necessary follow-up steps to determine if the suggested courses of 
actions matches other state priorities.  
Changing government regulation and regulatory strategy may require more than 
checklists, but a change in societal attitudes towards data rights. To use an analogy: privacy 
programs are centered around building trust between an organization and the individual sharing 
his or her data. Similarly, a GDPR adequacy decision relies as much on trust as on black-letter 
law. For an application to succeed, the legal privacy protections in the applicant’s jurisdiction 
should reflect the concerted will of the people and show the good faith of both parties to respect 






• General Data Protection Regulation, “CHAPTER V, TRANSFER OF PERSONAL 
DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, 
Articles 44-50.” 
•  “Will GDPR Impact States and Localities?”; 
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Privacy Shield”; 
• “Annex I: Supplementary Rules under the Act on the Protection of Personal 
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Adequacy Decision.”; 
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data in Japan”; 
• South Carolina Constitution, “Article I, Declaration of Rights”; and 
• “Article 29 Working Party Adequacy Referential 18/EN WP 254 rev.01” 
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9. The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying down technical standards for 
certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks, and mechanisms to promote 
and recognise those certification mechanisms, seals and marks. Those implementing acts 
shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2). 
CHAPTER V 
TRANSFER OF PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES  
OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
Article 44  
General principle for transfers 
Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after 
transfer to a third country or to an international organisation shall take place only if, subject to the 
other provisions of this Regulation, the conditions laid down in this Chapter are complied with by 
the controller and processor, including for onward transfers of personal data from the third country 
or an international organisation to another third country or to another international organisation. All 
provisions in this Chapter shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural 
persons guaranteed by this Regulation is not undermined. 
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Article 45  
Transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision 
1. A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take 
place where the Commission has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more 
specified sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question 
ensures an adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall not require any specific 
authorisation. 
2. When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission shall, in 
particular, take account of the following elements: 
(a) the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant 
legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, 
national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal 
data, as well as the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, 
professional rules and security measures, including rules for the onward transfer of 
personal data to another third country or international organisation which are 
complied with in that country or international organisation, case-law, as well as 
effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial 
redress for the data subjects whose personal data are being transferred; 
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(b) the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory 
authorities in the third country or to which an international organisation is subject, 
with responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection 
rules, including adequate enforcement powers, for assisting and advising the data 
subjects in exercising their rights and for cooperation with the supervisory authorities 
of the Member States; and 
(c) the international commitments the third country or international organisation 
concerned has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding 
conventions or instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional 
systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data. 
3. The Commission, after assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, may decide, by 
means of implementing act, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors 
within a third country, or an international organisation ensures an adequate level of 
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article. The implementing act shall 
provide for a mechanism for a periodic review, at least every four years, which shall take 
into account all relevant developments in the third country or international organisation. 
The implementing act shall specify its territorial and sectoral application and, where 
applicable, identify the supervisory authority or authorities referred to in point (b) of 
paragraph 2 of this Article. The implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the 
examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2). 
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4. The Commission shall, on an ongoing basis, monitor developments in third countries and 
international organisations that could affect the functioning of decisions adopted pursuant 
to paragraph 3 of this Article and decisions adopted on the basis of Article 25(6) of 
Directive 95/46/EC. 
5. The Commission shall, where available information reveals, in particular following the 
review referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, that a third country, a territory or one or 
more specified sectors within a third country, or an international organisation no longer 
ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, 
to the extent necessary, repeal, amend or suspend the decision referred to in paragraph 3 of 
this Article by means of implementing acts without retro-active effect. Those 
implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred 
to in Article 93(2). 
On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately 
applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 93(3). 
6. The Commission shall enter into consultations with the third country or international 
organisation with a view to remedying the situation giving rise to the decision made 
pursuant to paragraph 5. 
7. A decision pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article is without prejudice to transfers of 
personal data to the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that 
third country, or the international organisation in question pursuant to Articles 46 to 49. 
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8. The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Union and on its 
website a list of the third countries, territories and specified sectors within a third country 
and international organisations for which it has decided that an adequate level of protection 
is or is no longer ensured. 
9. Decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC 
shall remain in force until amended, replaced or repealed by a Commission Decision 
adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 or 5 of this Article. 
Article 46  
Transfers subject to appropriate safeguards 
1. In the absence of a decision pursuant to Article 45(3), a controller or processor may 
transfer personal data to a third country or an international organisation only if the 
controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on condition that 
enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available. 
2. The appropriate safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 may be provided for, without 
requiring any specific authorisation from a supervisory authority, by: 
(a) a legally binding and enforceable instrument between public authorities or bodies; 
(b) binding corporate rules in accordance with Article 47; 
(c) standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission in accordance with the 
examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2); 
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(d) standard data protection clauses adopted by a supervisory authority and approved by 
the Commission pursuant to the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2); 
(e) an approved code of conduct pursuant to Article 40 together with binding and 
enforceable commitments of the controller or processor in the third country to apply 
the appropriate safeguards, including as regards data subjects' rights; or 
(f) an approved certification mechanism pursuant to Article 42 together with binding 
and enforceable commitments of the controller or processor in the third country to 
apply the appropriate safeguards, including as regards data subjects' rights. 
3. Subject to the authorisation from the competent supervisory authority, the appropriate 
safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 may also be provided for, in particular, by: 
(a) contractual clauses between the controller or processor and the controller, processor 
or the recipient of the personal data in the third country or international organisation; 
or 
(b) provisions to be inserted into administrative arrangements between public authorities 
or bodies which include enforceable and effective data subject rights. 
4. The supervisory authority shall apply the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 63 
in the cases referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article. 
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5. Authorisations by a Member State or supervisory authority on the basis of Article 26(2) of 
Directive 95/46/EC shall remain valid until amended, replaced or repealed, if necessary, by 
that supervisory authority. Decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of 
Article 26(4) of Directive 95/46/EC shall remain in force until amended, replaced or 
repealed, if necessary, by a Commission Decision adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 
of this Article. 
Article 47  
Binding corporate rules 
1. The competent supervisory authority shall approve binding corporate rules in accordance 
with the consistency mechanism set out in Article 63, provided that they: 
(a) are legally binding and apply to and are enforced by every member concerned of the 
group of undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity, 
including their employees; 
(b) expressly confer enforceable rights on data subjects with regard to the processing of 
their personal data; and 
(c) fulfil the requirements laid down in paragraph 2. 
2. The binding corporate rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall specify at least: 
(a) the structure and contact details of the group of undertakings, or group of enterprises 
engaged in a joint economic activity and of each of its members; 
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(b) the data transfers or set of transfers, including the categories of personal data, the 
type of processing and its purposes, the type of data subjects affected and the 
identification of the third country or countries in question; 
(c) their legally binding nature, both internally and externally; 
(d) the application of the general data protection principles, in particular purpose 
limitation, data minimisation, limited storage periods, data quality, data protection by 
design and by default, legal basis for processing, processing of special categories of 
personal data, measures to ensure data security, and the requirements in respect of 
onward transfers to bodies not bound by the binding corporate rules; 
(e) the rights of data subjects in regard to processing and the means to exercise those 
rights, including the right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling in accordance with Article 22, the right to lodge a 
complaint with the competent supervisory authority and before the competent courts 
of the Member States in accordance with Article 79, and to obtain redress and, where 
appropriate, compensation for a breach of the binding corporate rules; 
(f) the acceptance by the controller or processor established on the territory of a 
Member State of liability for any breaches of the binding corporate rules by any 
member concerned not established in the Union; the controller or the processor shall 
be exempt from that liability, in whole or in part, only if it proves that that member is 
not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage; 
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(g) how the information on the binding corporate rules, in particular on the provisions 
referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of this paragraph is provided to the data subjects 
in addition to Articles 13 and 14; 
(h) the tasks of any data protection officer designated in accordance with Article 37 or 
any other person or entity in charge of the monitoring compliance with the binding 
corporate rules within the group of undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in a 
joint economic activity, as well as monitoring training and complaint-handling; 
(i) the complaint procedures; 
(j) the mechanisms within the group of undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in 
a joint economic activity for ensuring the verification of compliance with the binding 
corporate rules. Such mechanisms shall include data protection audits and methods 
for ensuring corrective actions to protect the rights of the data subject. Results of 
such verification should be communicated to the person or entity referred under 
point (h) and to the board of the controlling undertaking of a group of undertakings, 
or of the group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity, and should be 
available upon request to the competent supervisory authority; 
(k) the mechanisms for reporting and recording changes to the rules and reporting those 
changes to the supervisory authority; 
 
 
5419/16    AV/NT/sr 194 
 DGD 2  EN 
 
(l) the cooperation mechanism with the supervisory authority to ensure compliance by 
any member of the group of undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in a joint 
economic activity, in particular by making available to the supervisory authority the 
results of verifications of the measures referred to in point (j); 
(m) the mechanisms for reporting to the competent supervisory authority any legal 
requirements to which a member of the group of undertakings, or group of 
enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity is subject in a third country which 
are likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the guarantees provided by the 
binding corporate rules; and 
(n) the appropriate data protection training to personnel having permanent or regular 
access to personal data. 
3. The Commission may specify the format and procedures for the exchange of information 
between controllers, processors and supervisory authorities for binding corporate rules 
within the meaning of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance 
with the examination procedure set out in Article 93(2). 
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Article 48  
Transfers or disclosures not authorised by Union law 
Any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a third 
country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data may only be 
recognised or enforceable in any manner if based on an international agreement, such as a mutual 
legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a 
Member State, without prejudice to other grounds for transfer pursuant to this Chapter. 
Article 49  
Derogations for specific situations 
1. In the absence of an adequacy decision pursuant to Article 45(3), or of appropriate 
safeguards pursuant to Article 46, including binding corporate rules, a transfer or a set of 
transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation shall take place 
only on one of the following conditions: 
(a) the data subject has explicitly consented to the proposed transfer, after having been 
informed of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence 
of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards; 
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject 
and the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the 
data subject's request; 
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(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in 
the interest of the data subject between the controller and another natural or legal 
person; 
(d) the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interest; 
(e) the transfer is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; 
(f) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of 
other persons, where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving 
consent; 
(g) the transfer is made from a register which according to Union or Member State law is 
intended to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either 
by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate a legitimate interest, 
but only to the extent that the conditions laid down in Union or Member State law for 
consultation are fulfilled in the particular case. 
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Where a transfer could not be based on a provision in Articles 45 or 46, including the 
provisions on binding corporate rules, and none of the derogations for a specific situation 
pursuant to points (a) to (g) of this paragraph is applicable, a transfer to a third country or 
an international organisation may take place only if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns 
only a limited number of data subjects, is necessary for the purposes of compelling 
legitimate interests pursued by the controller which are not overridden by the interests or 
rights and freedoms of the data subject, and the controller has assessed all the 
circumstances surrounding the data transfer and has on the basis of that assessment 
provided suitable safeguards with regard to the protection of personal data. The controller 
shall inform the supervisory authority of the transfer. The controller shall, in addition to 
providing the information referred to in Articles 13 and 14, inform the data subject of the 
transfer and on the compelling legitimate interests pursued. 
2. A transfer pursuant to point (g) of paragraph 1 shall not involve the entirety of the personal 
data or entire categories of the personal data contained in the register. Where the register is 
intended for consultation by persons having a legitimate interest, the transfer shall be made 
only at the request of those persons or if they are to be the recipients. 
3. Points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph and the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 
shall not apply to activities carried out by public authorities in the exercise of their public 
powers. 
4. The public interest referred to in point (d) of paragraph 1 shall be recognised in Union law 
or in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject. 
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5. In the absence of an adequacy decision, Union or Member State law may, for important 
reasons of public interest, expressly set limits to the transfer of specific categories of 
personal data to a third country or an international organisation. Member States shall notify 
such provisions to the Commission. 
6. The controller or processor shall document the assessment as well as the suitable 
safeguards referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article in the 
records referred to in Article 30. 
Article 50 
International cooperation for the protection of personal data 
In relation to third countries and international organisations, the Commission and supervisory 
authorities shall take appropriate steps to: 
(a) develop international cooperation mechanisms to facilitate the effective enforcement of 
legislation for the protection of personal data; 
(b) provide international mutual assistance in the enforcement of legislation for the protection 
of personal data, including through notification, complaint referral, investigative assistance 
and information exchange, subject to appropriate safeguards for the protection of personal 
data and other fundamental rights and freedoms; 
(c) engage relevant stakeholders in discussion and activities aimed at furthering international 
cooperation in the enforcement of legislation for the protection of personal data; 
(d) promote the exchange and documentation of personal data protection legislation and 
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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL 
on the second annual review of the functioning of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 





1. THE SECOND ANNUAL REVIEW – PURPOSE, PREPARATION AND PROCESS 
 
On 12 July 2016, the Commission adopted a Decision (the “adequacy decision”) in which it 
found that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (the “Privacy Shield”) ensures an adequate level of 
protection for personal data that has been transferred from the EU to organisations in the U.S.
1
 
The adequacy decision notably provides for an annual evaluation of all aspects of the 
functioning of the framework by the Commission. The first annual review took place on 18 
and 19 September 2017 in Washington, D.C., and on 18 October 2017 the Commission 
adopted its report to the European Parliament and the Council,
2
 accompanied by a 
Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2017)344 final).
3
  
On the basis of its findings from the first review, the Commission concluded that the U.S. 
continued to ensure an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred under the 
Privacy Shield from the Union to organisations in the U.S. At the same time, the Commission 
considered that the practical implementation of the Privacy Shield framework could be further 
improved in order to ensure that the guarantees and safeguards provided therein continued to 
function as intended. To this end, the Commission made ten recommendations. 
The present report concludes the second annual review of the functioning of the Privacy 
Shield. This report, as well as the accompanying Staff Working Document (SWD(2018) 497), 
follow the same structure as the report on the first annual review. They cover all aspects of the 
functioning of the Privacy Shield, also in light of developments that took place during the last 
year. A central element of the Commission's assessment was the implementation of its 
recommendations from the first annual review. 
In preparation for the second annual review, the Commission gathered information from 
relevant stakeholders (in particular Privacy Shield-certified companies, through their 
respective trade associations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in the field 
of fundamental rights, in particular digital rights and privacy), as well as from the relevant 
U.S. authorities involved in the implementation of the framework. 
The second annual review meeting took place in Brussels on 18 and 19 October 2018. The 
review was opened by the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Věra 
Jourová, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, the Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission Joseph Simons and the Chair of the European Data Protection Board Andrea 
Jelinek. It was conducted for the EU by representatives of the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Justice and Consumers. The EU delegation also included seven 
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representatives designated by the European Data Protection Board (the independent body 
bringing together representatives of the national data protection authorities of the EU Member 
States and the European Data Protection Supervisor). 
 
On the U.S. side, representatives from the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, 
the Federal Trade Commission , the Department of Transportation, the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice and members of the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board  participated in the review, as well as the acting Ombudsperson and 
the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community. In addition, representatives from an 
organisation that offers independent dispute resolution services under the Privacy Shield and 
the American Arbitration Association provided information during the relevant review 
sessions. Finally, the review was informed by presentations from Privacy Shield-certified 
organisations on how companies comply with the requirements of the framework.  
 
The Commission’s findings have further been informed by a study commissioned by the 
Commission and publicly available material, such as court decisions, implementing rules and 
procedures of relevant U.S. authorities, reports and studies from non-governmental 
organisations, transparency reports issued by Privacy Shield-certified companies, annual 
reports from independent recourse mechanisms, as well as media reports. 
 
This year’s review took place in the context of the challenges to data privacy that are 
increasingly global in nature, as exemplified by the Facebook / Cambridge Analytica case. 
Both the EU and the U.S. are aware of the similar challenges they face when it comes to 
protection of personal data. During the review, both sides stressed the need to address such 
abuses of personal data, including through the vigorous enforcement actions by the EU’s Data 
Protection Authority and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.  
 
The Commission’s report also reflects the ongoing debate about federal privacy legislation in 
the U.S. The convergence between our two systems in the long term would strengthen the 
foundations on which the Privacy Shield framework has been developed. 
2. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The second annual review covered both the “commercial aspects” of the Privacy Shield 
framework and issues relating to government access to personal data.  
As regards the “commercial aspects”, i.e. questions concerning the administration, oversight 
and enforcement of the obligations applying to certified companies, the Commission noted 
that in line with the Commission's recommendations from the first annual review, the 
Department of Commerce has further strengthened the certification process and introduced 
new oversight procedures. In particular, the Department of Commerce adopted a new process 
that requires first-time applicants to delay public representations regarding their Privacy 
Shield participation until their certification review is finalised by the Department of 




detect potential compliance issues, such as random spot-checks (at the time of the annual 
review, such spot checks had been performed on about 100 organisations) and the monitoring 
of public reports about the privacy practices of Privacy Shield participants. In the search for 
false claims of participation in the framework, the Department of Commerce is now actively 
using a variety of tools, for instance a quarterly review of companies that have been identified 
as more likely to make false claims and a system for image and text searches on the internet. 
As a result of these newly introduced practices and procedures, the Department of Commerce 
since the first annual review has referred more than 50 cases to the Federal Trade 
Commission, which in turn took enforcement action in those cases where the referral as such 
was not sufficient in order to make the company concerned come into compliance.  
With respect to enforcement, the Commission noted that the Federal Trade Commission, as 
part of its efforts to proactively monitor compliance with the Privacy Shield Principles, 
recently issued administrative subpoenas to request information from a number of Privacy 
Shield participants. The Federal Trade Commission has also confirmed that its investigation 
into the Facebook / Cambridge Analytica case is ongoing. Although the Commission 
considers that the Federal Trade Commission's new, more proactive approach to compliance 
monitoring is an important development, it regrets that at this stage it was not possible for to 
provide further information on its recent investigations and will closely monitor any further 
developments in this regard. 
The second annual review also took into account relevant developments in the U.S. legal 
system in the area of privacy. These concern, in particular, the consultation initiated by the 
Department of Commerce on a federal approach to data privacy as well as the Federal Trade 
Commission’s process of reflection on its current powers in the area of privacy and the 
efficacy of the use of its current remedial authority.  
As the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica case and other revelations have shown, it would be 
important that the EU and the U.S. further converge in their responses. In this spirit, the 
Commission has observed the abovementioned initiatives with great interest and has 




Regarding aspects relating to access and use of personal data by U.S. public authorities, the 
second annual review focused on relevant developments in the U.S. legal framework, 
including with regard to relevant agency policies and procedures, on recent trends in 
surveillance activities, and on developments in the setup and functioning of important 
oversight and redress mechanisms.  
The most important legal development in the area of government access was the 
reauthorisation of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  (“the Act”) at the 
beginning of 2018. While the reauthorisation did not lead to the incorporation of the 
protections of Presidential Policy Directive 28 into the Act, as had been suggested by the 
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Commission, neither did it restrict any of the safeguards contained in the Act which were in 
place when the Privacy Shield decision was adopted. Moreover, the amendments did not 
expand the powers of the U.S. Intelligence Community to acquire foreign intelligence 
information by targeting non-U.S. persons under Section 702. Instead, the Amendments 
Reauthorization Act of 2017, which amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, introduced some limited additional privacy safeguards, for instance in the area of 
transparency. 
There have also been important developments concerning the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board which, at the time of the first annual review, had only one Board member 
left. The Commission had therefore recommended the swift appointment of the missing Board 
members. On 11 October 2018, the U.S. Senate confirmed the nominations of the Chairman 
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board as well as of two other members of the 
Board, thereby reinstalling the Board to its full quorum and allowing it to exercise all its 
functions. After the first annual review, the Commission had also recommended the public 
release of the Board’s report on Presidential Policy Directive 28. The report was released on 
16 October 2018
5
 and confirms that Presidential Policy Directive 28 is fully applied across the 
Intelligence Community. In particular, it confirms that further to the issuance of Presidential 
Policy Directive 28, the relevant elements of the Intelligence Community have adopted 
detailed rules on the implementation of that Directive and have changed their practices in 
order to bring them in line with the requirements of Presidential Policy Directive 28. 
Finally, although the Commission had recommended the swift appointment of the Privacy 
Shield Ombudsperson, the position of Under-Secretary in the State Department to whom the 
office of the Ombudsperson has been assigned had not yet been filled by a permanent 
appointment at the time of the present report. In that regard, the Commission took note of the 
fact that at the second annual review, the U.S. government recognised the need for prompt 
progress on nominating a permanent Under Secretary and confirmed that this process is well 
underway.  
At the time of the present report, the Ombudsperson mechanism had not yet received any 
requests. However, a complaint to the Ombudsperson had been submitted to the Croatian data 
protection authority and the relevant checks were ongoing.  
The detailed findings concerning the functioning of all aspects of the Privacy Shield 
framework after its second year of operation are presented in the Commission Staff Working 
Document on the second annual review of the functioning of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
(SWD(2018) 497) which accompanies the present report. 
The information gathered in the context of the second annual review confirms the 
Commission’s findings in the adequacy decision, both with regard to the “commercial 
aspects” of the framework and aspects relating to access to personal data transferred under the 
Privacy Shield by the U.S. authorities.  
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On the basis of these findings, the Commission concludes that the United States continues to 
ensure an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred under the Privacy 
Shieldfrom the Union to organisations in the United States.  
In particular, the steps taken to implement the Commission's recommendations following the 
first annual review have improved several aspects of the practical functioning of the 
framework in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons guaranteed by the 
adequacy decision is not undermined. 
However, some of these steps have been taken only recently and the relevant processes are 
still ongoing. Any further developments concerning these processes therefore need to be 
closely monitored, in particular as they affect elements that are essential for the continuity of 
the adequacy finding. This concerns notably: 
1. The effectiveness of the mechanisms introduced by the Department of Commerce in 
the second year of operation of the framework to proactively monitor compliance by 
certified companies with the Privacy Shield Principles, in particular compliance with 
substantive requirements and obligations. 
 
2. The effectiveness of the tools introduced by the Department of Commerce since the 
first annual review to detect false claims of participation in the framework, with a 
particular focus on the search of false claims by companies that have never applied for 
certification. 
 
3. The progress and outcome of ex-officio sweeps carried out by the Federal Trade 
Commission in the second year of operation of the Privacy Shield by means of 
administrative subpoenas to detect substantive violations of the Privacy Shield. 
 
4. The development of additional guidance jointly by the Department of Commerce, 
Federal Trade Commission and EU data protection authorities on elements that require 
further clarification (e.g. HR data). 
 
5. The appointment of a permanent Privacy Shield Ombudsperson. 
 
6. The effectiveness of the handling and resolution of complaints by the Ombudsperson. 
 
In particular, the Commission reiterates its call on the U.S. administration to confirm its 
political commitment to the Ombudsperson mechanism by appointing a permanent Privacy 
Shield Ombudsperson as a matter of priority. The Ombudsperson mechanism is an important 
element of the Privacy Shield framework and, while the acting Ombudsperson continues to 
carry out the relevant functions, the absence of a permanent appointee is highly unsatisfactory 
and should be remedied as soon as possible. The Commission expects the U.S. government to 
identify a nominee to fill the Ombudsperson position on a permanent basis by 28 February 




by that date, the Commission will then consider taking appropriate measures, in accordance 
with the General Data Protection Regulation
6
. The Commission also expects to receive 
precise and detailed information on all of the abovementioned aspects in order to be able to 
assess whether the steps taken are effective in practice. 
Finally, the Commission will continue to closely follow the ongoing debate about the federal 
privacy legislation in the U.S. Given the significance of transatlantic data flows, the 
Commission encourages the U.S. to adopt a comprehensive system of privacy and data 
protection and to become a Party to the Council of Europe’s Convention 108. It is through 
such comprehensive approach that convergence between our two systems can be achieved in 
the longer term, which would also strengthen the foundations on which the Privacy Shield 
framework has been developed. 
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“Act”                          The Act on the Protection of Personal Information (Act No. 
57, 2003) 
“Cabinet Order”              Cabinet Order to Enforce the Act on the Protection of 
Personal Information (Cabinet Order No. 507, 2003) 
“Rules”                       Enforcement Rules for the Act on the Protection of 
Personal Information (Rules of the Personal Information 
Protection Commission No. 3, 2016) 
"General Rules Guidelines"    Guidelines for the Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information (Volume on General Rules) (Notice of the 
Personal Information Protection Commission No. 65, 
2015) 
     
 
 
“EU”                           European Union, including its Member States and, in the 
light of the EEA Agreement, Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway 
“GDPR”                       Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC（General 
Data Protection Regulation） 
“adequacy decision”            The European Commission’s decision that a third country 
or a territory within that third country, etc. ensures an 
adequate level of protection of personal data pursuant to 
Article 45 of the GDPR 
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The Personal Information Protection Commission, for the purpose of 
conducting mutual and smooth transfer of personal data between Japan and the 
EU, designated the EU as a foreign country establishing a personal information 
protection system recognized to have equivalent standards to that in Japan in 
regard to the protection of an individual’s rights and interests based on Article 24 
of the Act and the European Commission concurrently decided that Japan 
ensures an adequate level of protection of personal data pursuant to Article 45 of 
the GDPR.  
Hereby, mutual and smooth transfer of personal data will be conducted 
between Japan and the EU in a way that ensures a high level of protection of an 
individual’s rights and interests. In order to ensure that high level of protection 
regarding personal information received from the EU based on an adequacy 
decision and in light of the fact that, despite a high degree of convergence 
between the two systems, there are some relevant differences, the Personal 
Information Protection Commission has adopted these Supplementary Rules, 
based on the provisions of the Act concerning implementation etc. of 
cooperation with the governments in other countries and in view of ensuring 
appropriate handling of personal information received from the EU based on an 
adequacy decision by a personal information handling business operator and 
proper and effective implementation of the obligations laid down in such rules 
(*1).  
In particular, Article 6 of the Act provides for the power to take necessary 
legislative and other action with a view to ensure the enhanced protection of 
personal information and construct an internationally conformable system 
concerning personal information through stricter rules that supplement and go 
beyond those laid down in the Act and the Cabinet Order. Therefore, the 
Personal Information Protection Commission, as the authority competent for 
governing the overall administration of the Act, has the power to establish 
pursuant to Article 6 of the Act stricter regulations by formulating the present 
Supplementary Rules providing for a higher level of protection of an individual’s 
rights and interests regarding the handling of personal data received from the 
EU based on an adequacy decision, including with respect to the definition of 
special care-required personal information pursuant to Article 2, paragraph (3), 
of the Act and retained personal data pursuant to Article 2, paragraph (7), of the 
Act (including as to the relevant retention period).  
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On this basis, the Supplementary Rules are binding on a personal 
information handling business operator that receives personal data transferred 
from the EU based on an adequacy decision which is thus required to comply 
with them. As legally binding rules, any rights and obligations are enforceable by 
the Personal Information Protection Commission in the same way as the 
provisions of the Act that they supplement with stricter and/or more detailed 
rules. In case of infringement of the rights and obligations resulting from the 
Supplementary Rules, individuals can also obtain redress from courts in the 
same way as with respect to the provisions of the Act that they supplement with 
stricter and/or more detailed rules. 
As regards enforcement by the Personal Information Protection 
Commission, in case a personal information handling business operator does 
not comply with one or several obligations under the Supplementary Rules, the 
Personal Information Protection Commission has the power to adopt measures 
pursuant to Article 42 of the Act. Regarding generally personal information 
received from the EU based on an adequacy decision, failure by a personal 
information handling business operator to take action in line with a 
recommendation received pursuant to Article 42, paragraph (1), of the Act, 
without legitimate ground (*2), is considered as a serious infringement of an 
imminent nature of an individual’s rights and interests within the meaning of 
Article 42, paragraph (2), of the Act.  
 
 
(*1) Article 4, Article 6, Article 8, Article 24, Article 60 and Article 78 of the Act, and Article 11 
of the Rules. 
     
(*2) Legitimate ground shall be understood as meaning an event of an extraordinary nature 
outside the control of the personal information handling business operator which cannot 
be reasonably foreseen (for example, natural disasters) or when the necessity to take 
action concerning a recommendation issued by the Personal Information Protection 
Commission pursuant to Article 42, paragraph (1), of the Act has disappeared because 
the personal information handling business operator has taken alternative action that 
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Article 2 (paragraph 3) of the Act 
(3) Special care-required personal information” in this Act means personal 
information comprising a principal's race, creed, social status, medical 
history, criminal record, fact of having suffered damage by a crime, or other 
descriptions etc. prescribed by cabinet order as those of which the 
handling requires special care so as not to cause unfair discrimination, 
prejudice or other disadvantages to the principal. 
 
Article 2 of the Cabinet Order 
Those descriptions etc. prescribed by cabinet order under Article 2, paragraph 
(3) of the Act shall be those descriptions etc. which contain any of those 
matters set forth in the following (excluding those falling under a principal’s 
medical record or criminal history) 
(i) the fact of having physical disabilities, intellectual disabilities, mental 
disabilities (including developmental disabilities), or other physical and 
mental functional disabilities prescribed by rules of the Personal 
Information Protection Commission; 
(ii) the results of a medical check-up or other examination (hereinafter 
referred to as a “medical check-up etc.” in the succeeding item) for the 
prevention and early detection of a disease conducted on a principal by a 
medical doctor or other person engaged in duties related to medicine 
(hereinafter referred to as a “doctor etc.” in the succeeding item); 
(iii) the fact that guidance for the improvement of the mental and physical 
conditions, or medical care or prescription has been given to a principal 
by a doctor etc. based on the results of a medical check-up etc. or for 
reason of disease, injury or other mental and physical changes; 
(iv) the fact that an arrest, search, seizure, detention, institution of 
prosecution or other procedures related to a criminal case have been 
carried out against a principal as a suspect or defendant; 
(v) the fact that an investigation, measure for observation and protection, 
hearing and decision, protective measure or other procedures related to 
a juvenile protection case have been carried out against a principal as a 
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juvenile delinquent or a person suspected thereof under Article 3, 
paragraph (1) of the Juvenile Act. 
 
Article 5 of the Rules 
Physical and mental functional disabilities prescribed by rules of the Personal 
Information Protection Commission under Article 2, item (i) of the Order shall 
be those disabilities set forth in the following. 
(i) physical disabilities set forth in an appended table of the Act for Welfare 
of Persons with Physical Disabilities (Act No.283 of 1949) 
(ii) intellectual disabilities referred to under the Act for the Welfare of 
Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (Act No.37 of 1960) 
(iii) mental disabilities referred to under the Act for the Mental Health and 
Welfare of the Persons with Mental Disabilities (Act No.123 of 1950) 
(including developmental disabilities prescribed in Article 2, paragraph 
(1) of the Act on Support for Persons with Development Disabilities, and 
excluding intellectual disabilities under the Act for the Welfare of 
Persons with Intellectual Disabilities) 
(iv) a disease with no cure methods established thereof or other peculiar 
diseases of which the severity by those prescribed by cabinet order 
under Article 4, paragraph (1) of the Act on Comprehensive Support for 
Daily and Social Lives of Persons with Disabilities (Act No. 123 of 2005) 
is equivalent to those prescribed by the Minister of Health, Labor and 
Welfare under the said paragraph 
 
If personal data received from the EU based on an adequacy decision 
contains data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation or 
trade-union membership, which are defined as special categories of personal 
data under the GDPR, personal information handling business operators are 
required to handle that personal data in the same manner as special 
care-required personal information within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph (3) 
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(2) Retained personal data (Article 2, paragraph (7) of the Act) 
 
Article 2 (paragraph 7) of the Act 
(7) “Retained personal data” in this Act means personal data which a personal 
information handling business operator has the authority to disclose, 
correct, add or delete the contents of, cease the utilization of, erase, and 
cease the third-party provision of, and which shall be neither those 
prescribed by cabinet order as likely to harm the public or other interests if 
their presence or absence is made known nor those set to be deleted 
within a period of no longer than one year that is prescribed by Cabinet 
Order. 
 
Article 4 of the Cabinet Order 
Those prescribed by cabinet order under Article 2, paragraph (7) shall be 
those set forth in the following. 
(i) those in relation to which there is a possibility that if the presence or 
absence of the said personal data is made known, it would harm a 
principal or third party’s life, body or fortune; 
(ii) those in relation to which there is a possibility that if the presence or 
absence of the said personal data is made known, it would encourage or 
induce an illegal or unjust act; 
(iii) those in relation to which there is a possibility that if the presence or 
absence of the said personal data is made known, it would undermine 
national security, destroy a trust relationship with a foreign country or 
international organization, or suffer disadvantage in negotiations with a 
foreign country or international organization; 
(iv) those in relation to which there is a possibility that if the presence or 
absence of the said personal data is made known, it would hinder the 
maintenance of public safety and order such as the prevention, 
suppression or investigation of a crime. 
 
Article 5 of the Cabinet Order 
A period prescribed by Cabinet Order under Article 2, paragraph (7) of the Act 
shall be six months. 
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Personal data received from the EU based on an adequacy decision is 
required to be handled as retained personal data within the meaning of Article 2, 
paragraph (7) of the Act, irrespective of the period within which it is set to be 
deleted. 
If personal data received from the EU based on an adequacy decision falls 
within the scope of personal data prescribed by Cabinet Order as being "likely to 
harm the public or other interests if their presence or absence is made known," 
such data is not required to be handled as retained personal data (see Article 4 
of the Cabinet Order; General Rules Guidelines, "2-7. Retained personal data"). 
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(3) Specifying a utilization purpose, restriction due to a utilization purpose 
(Article 15, paragraph (1), Article 16, paragraph (1) and Article 26, 
paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Act) 
 
Article 15 (paragraph 1) of the Act 
(1) A personal information handling business operator shall, in handling 
personal information, specify the purpose of utilizing the personal 
information (hereinafter referred to as a “utilization purpose”) as explicitly 
as possible. 
 
Article 16 (paragraph 1) of the Act 
(1) A personal information handling business operator shall not handle 
personal information without obtaining in advance a principal’s consent 
beyond the necessary scope to achieve a utilization purpose specified 
pursuant to the provisions under the preceding Article. 
 
Article 26 (paragraphs 1 and 3) of the Act 
(1) A personal information handling business operator shall, when receiving 
the provision of personal data from a third party, confirm those matters set 
forth in the following pursuant to rules of the Personal Information 
Protection Commission. (omitted) 
(i)  (omitted) 
(ii) circumstances under which the said personal data was acquired by the 
said third party 
 
(3)  A personal information handling business operator shall, when having 
confirmed pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1), keep a record 
pursuant to rules of the Personal Information Protection Commission on 
the date when it received the provision of personal data, a matter 
concerning the said confirmation, and other matters prescribed by rules of 
the Personal Information Protection Commission. 
 
If personal information handling business operators handle personal 
information beyond the necessary scope to achieve a utilization purpose 
specified under Article 15, paragraph (1) of the Act, they shall obtain the relevant 
principal's consent in advance (Article 16, paragraph (1) of the Act). When 
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receiving the provision of personal data from a third party, personal information 
handling business operators shall, pursuant to the Rules, confirm matters such 
as the circumstances under which the said personal data was acquired by the 
said third party, and record these matters (Article 26, paragraphs (1) and (3) of 
the Act). 
In the case where a personal information handling business operator 
receives personal data from the EU based on an adequacy decision, the 
circumstances regarding the acquisition of the said personal data which shall be 
confirmed and recorded as prescribed by Article 26, paragraphs (1) and (3), 
include the utilization purpose for which it was received from the EU.  
Similarly, in the case where a personal information handling business 
operator receives from another personal information handling business operator 
personal data previously transferred from the EU based on an adequacy 
decision, the circumstances regarding the acquisition of the said personal data 
which shall be confirmed and recorded as prescribed by Article 26, paragraphs 
(1) and (3), include the utilization purpose for which it was received.  
In the above-mentioned cases, the personal information handling business 
operator is required to specify the purpose of utilizing the said personal data 
within the scope of the utilization purpose for which the data was originally or 
subsequently received, as confirmed and recorded pursuant to Article 26, 
paragraphs (1) and (3), and utilize that data within the said scope (as prescribed 
by Articles 15, paragraph (1) and Article 16, paragraph (1) of the Act). 
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(4) Restriction on provision to a third party in a foreign country (Article 24 of 
the Act; Article 11-2 of the Rules) 
 
Article 24 of the Act 
A personal information handling business operator, except in those cases set 
forth in each item of the preceding Article, paragraph (1), shall, in case of 
providing personal data to a third party (excluding a person establishing a 
system conforming to standards prescribed by rules of the Personal 
Information Protection Commission as necessary for continuously taking 
action equivalent to the one that a personal information handling business 
operator shall take concerning the handling of personal data pursuant to the 
provisions of this Section; hereinafter the same in this Article) in a foreign 
country (meaning a country or region located outside the territory of Japan; 
hereinafter the same) (excluding those prescribed by rules of the Personal 
Information Protection Commission as a foreign country establishing a 
personal information protection system recognized to have equivalent 
standards to that in Japan in regard to the protection of an individual’s rights 
and interests; hereinafter the same in this Article), in advance obtain a 
principal’s consent to the effect that he or she approves the provision to a third 
party in a foreign country. In this case, the provisions of the preceding Article 
shall not apply. 
 
Article 11-2 of the Rules 
Standards prescribed by rules of the Personal Information Protection 
Commission under Article 24 of the Act are to be falling under any of each 
following item. 
(i) a personal information handling business operator and a person who 
receives the provision of personal data have ensured in relation to the 
handling of personal data by the person who receives the provision the 
implementation of measures in line with the purport of the provisions 
under Chapter IV, Section 1 of the Act by an appropriate and reasonable 
method 
(ii) a person who receives the provision of personal data has obtained a 
recognition based on an international framework concerning the handling 
of personal information 
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A personal information handling business operator, in cases of providing a 
third party in a foreign country with personal data that it has received from the 
EU based on an adequacy decision, shall obtain in advance a principal’s 
consent to the effect that he or she approves the provision to a third party in a 
foreign country pursuant to Article 24 of the Act, after having been provided 
information on the circumstances surrounding the transfer necessary for the 
principal to make a decision on his/her consent, excluding the cases falling 
under one of the following (i) through (iii). 
(i) when the third party is in a country prescribed by the Rules as 
a foreign country establishing a personal information protection 
system recognized to have equivalent standards to that in 
Japan in regard to the protection of an individual’s rights and 
interests 
(ii) when a personal information handling business operator and 
the third party who receives the provision of personal data have, 
in relation to the handling of personal data by the third party, 
implemented together measures providing an equivalent level 
of protection to the Act, read together with the present 
Guidelines, by an appropriate and reasonable method 
(meaning a contract, other forms of binding agreements, or 
binding arrangements within a corporate group).  
(iii) in cases falling under each item of Article 23, paragraph (1) of 
the Act 
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(5) Anonymously processed information (Article 2, paragraph 9 and Article 36, 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Act) 
 
Article 2 (paragraph 9) of the Act 
(9) “Anonymously processed information” in this Act means information 
relating to an individual that can be produced from processing personal 
information so as neither to be able to identify a specific individual by 
taking action prescribed in each following item in accordance with the 
divisions of personal information set forth in each said item nor to be able 
to restore the personal information. 
(i) personal information falling under paragraph (1), item (i); 
Deleting a part of descriptions etc. contained in the said personal 
information (including replacing the said part of descriptions etc. with 
other descriptions etc. using a method with no regularity that can restore 
the said part of descriptions etc.) 
   (ii) personal information falling under paragraph (1), item (ii); 
Deleting all individual identification codes contained in the said personal 
information (including replacing the said individual identification codes 
with other descriptions etc. using a method with no regularity that can 
restore the said personal identification codes) 
 
Article 36 (paragraph 1) of the Act 
(1) A personal information handling business operator shall, when producing 
anonymously processed information (limited to those constituting 
anonymously processed information database etc.; hereinafter the same), 
process personal information in accordance with standards prescribed by 
rules of the Personal Information Protection Commission as those 
necessary to make it impossible to identify a specific individual and restore 
the personal information used for the production. 
 
Article 19 of the Rules 
Standards prescribed by rules of the Personal Information Protection 
Commission under Article 36, paragraph (1) of the Act shall be as follows. 
(i) deleting a whole or part of those descriptions etc. which can identify a 
specific individual contained in personal information (including replacing 
such descriptions etc. with other descriptions etc. using a method with 
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no regularity that can restore the whole or part of descriptions etc.) 
(ii) deleting all individual identification codes contained in personal 
information (including replacing such codes with other descriptions etc. 
using a method with no regularity that can restore the individual 
identification codes) 
(iii) deleting those codes (limited to those codes linking mutually plural 
information being actually handled by a personal information handling 
business operator) which link personal information and information 
obtained by having taken measures against the personal information 
(including replacing the said codes with those other codes which cannot 
link the said personal information and information obtained by having 
taken measures against the said personal information using a method 
with no regularity that can restore the said codes) 
(iv) deleting idiosyncratic descriptions etc. (including replacing such 
descriptions etc. with other descriptions etc. using a method with no 
regularity that can restore the idiosyncratic descriptions etc.) 
(v) besides action set forth in each preceding item, taking appropriate 
action based on the results from considering the attribute etc. of 
personal information database etc. such as a difference between 
descriptions etc. contained in personal information and descriptions etc. 
contained in other personal information constituting the personal 
information database etc. that encompass the said personal information 
 
Article 36 (paragraph 2) of the Act 
(2) A personal information handling business operator, when having produced 
anonymously processed information, shall, in accordance with standards 
prescribed by rules of the Personal Information Protection Commission as 
those necessary to prevent the leakage of information relating to those 
descriptions etc. and individual identification codes deleted from personal 
information used to produce the anonymously processed information, and 
information relating to a processing method carried out pursuant to the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph, take action for the security control 
of such information. 
 
Article 20 of the Rules 
Standards prescribed by rules of the Personal Information Protection 
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Commission under Article 36, paragraph (2) of the Act shall be as follows. 
(i) defining clearly the authority and responsibility of a person handling 
information relating to those descriptions etc. and individual 
identification codes which were deleted from personal information used 
to produce anonymously processed information and information relating 
to a processing method carried out pursuant to the provisions of Article 
36, paragraph (1) (limited to those which can restore the personal 
information by use of such relating information) (hereinafter referred to 
as “processing method etc. related information” in this Article.) 
(ii) establishing rules and procedures on the handling of processing method 
etc. related information, handling appropriately processing method etc. 
related information in accordance with the rules and procedures, 
evaluating the handling situation, and based on such evaluation results, 
taking necessary action to seek improvement 
(iii) taking necessary and appropriate action to prevent a person with no 
legitimate authority to handle processing method etc. related 
information from handling the processing method etc. related 
information 
 
Personal information received from the EU based on an adequacy decision 
shall only be considered anonymously processed information within the meaning 
of Article 2, paragraph (9) of the Act if the personal information handling 
business operator takes measures that make the de-identification of the 
individual irreversible for anyone including by deleting processing method etc. 
related information (meaning information relating to those descriptions etc. and 
individual identification codes which were deleted from personal information 
used to produce anonymously processed information and information relating to 
a processing method carried out pursuant to the provisions of Article 36, 
paragraph (1) of the Act (limited to those which can restore the personal 
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The European Data Protection Board 
 
Having regard to Article 70.1(s) of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (hereinafter “GDPR”), 
 
Having regard to the EEA Agreement and in particular to Annex XI and Protocol 37 thereof, as amended 
by the Decision of the EEA joint Committee No 154/2018 of 6 July 2018, 
 
Having regard to Article 12 and Article 22 of its Rules of Procedure of 25 May 2018, 
 
HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING OPINION: 
 
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. The European Commission endorsed   its draft implementing decision on the adequate protection of 
personal data by Japan pursuant to the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter: GDPR)1 on 5  
September 20182.  Following this, the European Commission initiated the procedure for its formal 
adoption.  
2. On 25 September 2018, the European Commission asked for the opinion of the European Data 
Protection Board (“EDPB”)3. The Commission was requested to provide the EDPB with all the necessary 
documentation with regards to this country, including any relevant correspondence with the 
government of Japan.   
3. In the light of the discussions held with the EDPB, the European Commission modified twice its draft 
adequacy decision, and sent its last version on 13 November 20184 The EDPB has based its present 
Opinion on this latest version of the draft implementing decision (hereinafter “draft adequacy 
decision”). 
4. The EDPB’s assessment of the level of protection ensured by the Commission’s adequacy decision has 
been made on the examination of the decision itself as well as on the basis of an analysis of the 
documentation made available 5– by the Commission6.  
5. The EDPB focused on the assessment of both the commercial aspects of the draft adequacy decision 
and on the government access to personal data transferred from the EU for the purposes of law 
enforcement and national security, including the legal remedies available to EU individuals. The EDPB 
                                                          
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC. 
2 See Press release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5433_en.htm. 
3 Pursuant to Article 70 (1) (s) of the GDPR. 
4 See Annex I of the EDPB Opinion for the updated version of the draft European Commission implementing 
decision.  
5 The EDPB based its analysis on translations provided by the Japanese authorities verified by the European 
Commission  




also assessed whether the safeguards provided under the Japanese legal framework are in place and 
effective.  
6. The EDPB has used as a main reference for this work its adequacy referential7 adopted in February 
2018.  
1.1   Areas of convergence 
7. The EDPB’s key objective has been to give an opinion to the European Commission on the level of 
protection afforded to individuals in the Japanese framework. It is important to recognise that the 
EDPB does not expect the Japanese legal framework to replicate European data protection law.  
8. However, the EDPB recalls that to be considered providing an adequate level of protection, the case 
law of the CJEU as well as Article 45 of the GDPR require that the third country's legislation needs to 
be aligned to the essence of the fundamental principles enshrined in the GDPR. In the areas of data 
protection, the EDPB further notes that there are key areas of alignment between the GDPR framework 
and the Japanese framework on certain core provisions such as data accuracy and minimisation, 
storage limitation, data security, purpose limitation and an independent supervisory authority, the 
Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC).  
9. In addition to the above, the EDPB welcomes the efforts made by the European Commission and the 
Japanese authorities to ensure that Japan provides an adequate level of protection to that of the GDPR 
especially by filling the gaps between the GDPR and the Japanese data protection framework through 
the adoption of additional rules by the PPC applicable only to personal data transferred from the EU 
to Japan, the Supplementary Rules. For example, the EDPB notes that the PPC agreed to treat further 
categories of data as sensitive data (sensitive data under the Japanese legislation do not include sex 
orientation nor trade union membership). In addition, the Supplementary Rules ensure that data 
subject rights will apply to all personal data transferred from the EU, irrespective of their retention 
period (whereas the Japanese legal system provides that data subject rights do not apply to personal 
data that are set to be deleted within a period of six months). 
10. The EDPB also notes the efforts of the European Commission in strengthening the adequacy decision 
in response to the concerns raised by the EDPB. 
1.2  General challenges 
11. Nonetheless, challenges remain and the EDPB suggests the following as the main areas that should be 
strengthened and closely monitored in the Japanese system.  
12. The first challenge relates to the monitoring of this new architecture of adequacy, which is combining 
an existing legal framework with specific Supplementary Rules, to ensure that it will be a sustainable 
and reliable system that will not raise practical issues regarding the concrete and efficient compliance 
by Japanese entities and enforcement by the PPC. 
13. Secondly, the EDPB takes note of the repeated commitments and reassurances of the European 
Commission and of the Japanese authorities regarding the binding and enforceable nature of the 
Supplementary Rules whilst inviting the European Commission to continuously monitor their binding 
nature and effective application in Japan as their legal value is an absolutely essential element of the 
EU – Japan adequacy. With respect to the PPC guidelines, the EDPB would welcome clarifications in 
                                                          
7 WP254, Adequacy Referential, 6 February 2018. 
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the draft adequacy decision in relation to their binding nature and asks the Commission to attentively 
monitor this aspect8.   
1.3  Specific commercial aspects 
14. In the area of the commercial aspects of the draft EU – Japan adequacy decision, the EDPB has some 
specific concerns and would like to request clarifications on some important matters. 
1.3.1 Concerns of the EDPB with regards to key data protection principles 
15. The EDPB welcomes that the Supplementary Rules exclude that personal data transferred from the EU 
is further transferred to a third country on the basis of APEC – CBPRs. In addition, the EDPB recognises 
that in its new draft of the adequacy decision, the European Commission committed itself to suspend 
the adequacy decision when onward transfers no longer ensure the continuity of protection.  
16. Under the Japanese legislation, one of the legal basis for onward transfers is the recognition of a third 
country as providing an adequate level of protection to that of Japan. However, the assessment of a 
third country as adequate by Japan seems not to include the specific “Supplementary Rules” 
negotiated between the European Commission and the PPC which are only applicable to EU personal 
data in order to provide for a level of protection essentially equivalent to the GDPR standards. It follows 
that EU personal data that are transferred from Japan to another third country not recognised as 
having an essentially equivalent data protection framework to the GDPR on the basis of a Japanese 
adequacy will not necessarily enjoy the specific protection for EU personal data anymore.  
17. It should however be borne in mind that onward transfers of personal data may occur to third 
countries which become subject to a possible later Japanese adequacy decision. These third 
countries may not have been subject of a previous assessment or adequacy finding of the EU. At this 
point the COM should take over its monitoring role and ensure the level of protection of EU data is 
maintained or consider suspension of this adequacy decision. 
18. Moreover, the EDPB has concerns in relation to the consent and transparency obligations of data 
controllers (PIHBOs). The EDPB made a careful check of these elements for the reason that, differently 
to European data protection law, the use of consent as a basis for processing and for transfers has a 
central role in the Japanese legal system. For example, the EDPB has concerns regarding the notion of 
consent which is not defined in a way to include the right to withdrawal, an essential element under 
EU law to ensure the data subject’s genuine control over his/her personal data. Regarding the 
transparency obligations of a PIHBO, there are doubts as to whether proactive information is given to 
data subjects.  
19. The EDPB is concerned that the Japanese redress system may not be of easy access to individuals in 
the EU needing support or wishing to make a complaint in light of the fact that PPC’s support is 
available via Helpline and in Japanese only. The same issue exists with the mediation service provided 
by the PPC as the system is not publicised on the English version of the PPC’s website whilst important 
informative documents, such as the frequently asked questions on the APPI, are also available in 
Japanese only. In this respect, the EDPB would welcome if the Commission could discuss with the PPC 
the possibility of setting up an online service, at least in English, aimed at providing support to, and 
handle complaints of, individuals in the EU – similar to the one envisaged in Annex II of this adequacy 
decision. The European Commission will also need to monitor closely the effectiveness of sanctions 
and of relevant remedies.  
                                                          




1.3.2 Need for clarification 
20. The EDPB would welcome assurances on some aspects of the draft adequacy decision on which further 
clarification is still needed.  
21. These relate for example, to some key concepts of the Japanese legislation. More specifically, there is 
a lack of clarity around the status of the so-called “trustee”- a term which resembles to the one of the 
data processor under the GDPR but whose ability to determine and change the purposes and means 
of processing of personal data remains ambiguous.  
22. The EDPB would also need assurances due to lack of the relevant documents, on whether the 
restrictions to the rights of individuals (in particular, rights of access, rectification, and objection) are 
necessary and proportionate in a democratic society and respect the essence of fundamental rights.  
23. The EDPB would also expect that the European Commission closely monitors  the effective protection 
of personal data transferred from the EU to Japan, based on the draft adequacy decision,  throughout 
their whole “life cycle” even though the Japanese legislation imposes a record keeping obligation of 
the origin of the data for a maximum of three years. 
1.4 On the access by public authorities to data transferred to Japan 
24. The EDPB has also analysed the legal framework for Japanese governmental entities when accessing 
personal data transferred from the EU to Japan for law enforcement or national security purposes. 
While acknowledging the reassurances provided by the Japanese government, referred to as the Annex 
II to the draft adequacy decision, the EDPB has identified a number of aspects for clarifications and of 
concern, of which the following should be highlighted.  
25. In the area of law enforcement, the EDPB notes that the legal principles applying to access data often 
appear to be similar to the rules in the EU, to the extent they are available. The lack of available 
translations of several legal texts and of relevant case law make it difficult, however, to conclude that 
all the procedures for accessing data are necessary and proportionate and that the application of those 
principles are applied in a way which is “essentially equivalent” to EU law.  
26. In the area of national security, the EDPB recognises that the Japanese government has restated that 
information may only be obtained from freely accessible sources or through voluntary disclosure by 
companies, and that it does not collect information on the general public. It is aware, however, of 
concerns expressed by experts and in the media, and would welcome further clarification on 
surveillance measures by Japanese governmental entities.   
27. As to the legal redress of EU individuals, in the area of law enforcement as well as national security, 
the EDPB welcomes that the European Commission and the Japanese government have negotiated an 
additional mechanism for EU individuals to provide them with an additional redress avenue, and 
thereby extending the powers of the Japanese data protection authority. However, a point of concern 
remains that this new mechanism does not entirely compensate for the shortcomings of oversight and 
redress under Japanese law. The EDPB thus seeks for further clarifications in order to ensure that this 
new mechanism does fully compensate those shortcomings. 
1.5 Conclusion 
28. The EDPB considers that this adequacy decision is of paramount importance. As the first adequacy 
decision since the entering into force of GDPR, it will constitute a precedent for future adequacy 
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applications as well as for the review of the adequacy decisions rendered under Directive 95/469. It 
is also important to underline that individuals are more and more conscious of the impact of 
globalisation on their privacy and turn to their supervisory authorities to ensure that adequate 
guarantees are in place when their personal data are transferred abroad. In light of these implications, 
the EDPB believes that the European Commission should ensure that there are no shortcomings in the 
protection offered by the EU-Japan adequacy and that this specific type of adequacy is aligned with 
the requirements of Article 45 of the GDPR.  
29. The EDPB welcomes the efforts made by the European Commission and the Japanese PPC to align as 
much as possible the Japanese legal framework to the European one. The improvements brought in 
by the Supplementary Rules to bridge some of the differences between the two frameworks are very 
important and well received.  
30. However, following a careful analysis of the Commission’s draft adequacy decision as well as of the 
Japanese data protection framework, the EDPB notices that a number of concerns, coupled with the 
need for further clarifications, remain. Further, this specific type of adequacy combining an existing 
national framework with additional specific rules also raises questions about its operational 
implementation. In light of the above, the EDPB recommends the European Commission to address 
the concerns and requests for clarification raised by the EDPB and provide further evidence and 
explanations regarding the issues being raised. The EDPB also invites the European Commission to 
conduct a review of this adequacy finding (at least) every two years and not every four years as 
suggested in the current draft adequacy decision.   
2 INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Japan’s data protection framework 
31. Japan’s data protection framework was modernized very recently, in 2017. This framework comprises 
several pillars, at the centre of which there is a general statutory law, the Act on Protection of Personal 
Information (APPI). Another important piece of legislation is the Cabinet Order to Enforce the APPI 
(“Cabinet Order”) which specifies certain core principles of the APPI.  
32. Based on a Cabinet decision, adopted on 12 June 201810 and Article 6 of the APPI, the PPC was given 
the power to “take necessary action to bridge the differences of the systems and operations between 
Japan and the concerned foreign country in view of ensuring appropriate handling of personal 
information received from each country”11. The Cabinet decision also suggests that the rules adopted 
by the PPC supplementing or going beyond those laid down in the APPI would be binding and 
enforceable on the Japanese business operators12.  
33. Accordingly, the PPC engaged in negotiations with the European Commission and adopted, in June 
2018, stricter rules to the ones of the APPI and the Cabinet Order to be applied to data transferred 
from the EU.  These are the Supplementary Rules under the Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information for the Handling of Personal Data Transferred from the EU based on an adequacy decision, 
                                                          
9 Directive No. 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
10 The EDPB notes that according to the draft adequacy decision this Cabinet Decision was adopted on 12 June 
2018. However, the EDPB was only provided with the draft version of the Cabinet Decision, dated April 2018.  
11 Cabinet Decision of April 25th, 2018. 
12 See section 1.3.4 below for more information.  
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hereafter “Supplementary Rules”13. These Supplementary Rules are also annexed to the draft 
implementing Commission decision published in July 2018.  
34. It is important to note that the Supplementary Rules are only applicable to personal data transferred 
from the European Union to Japan on the basis of the adequacy decision and aim at enhancing the 
applicable protection to those data. As such they do not apply to personal data of individuals in Japan 
or coming from other countries than the ones of the EEA.  
35. Further, the EDPB would like to draw attention to the fact that the amended APPI came into force  on 
May 30, 2017 and the PPC in its current form was established in 2016. Moreover, the Supplementary 
Rules negotiated by the PPC with the European Commission have yet to enter into force as that will 
depend on the recognition by the European Commission of Japan as a jurisdiction adequate to the one 
in the EU. 
2.2 Scope of the EDPB’s assessment 
36. The European Commission’s draft adequacy decision is the result of an assessment of the Japanese 
data protection rules, followed by negotiations with the Japanese authorities. The outcome of these 
negotiations is notably reflected in the two annexes attached to the draft adequacy decision: the first 
one provides for additional protections that Japanese business operators will have to apply to the 
processing of personal data transferred from the EU, while the second one contains assurances and 
commitments from the Japanese government concerning public authorities' access to data. 
37. The EDPB examined the Japanese data protection framework, the Supplementary Rules negotiated by 
the European Commission and the assurances and commitments from the Japanese government. The 
EDPB is expected to provide an independent opinion on the European Commission’s findings, identify 
insufficiencies in the adequacy framework, if any, and endeavour to propose alterations or 
amendments to address these.  
38. As mentioned in the EDPB adequacy referential, “the information provided by the European 
Commission should be exhaustive and put the EDPB in a position to make an own assessment regarding 
the level of data protection in the third country”14.  
39. Nonetheless, the EDPB received most of the documents in English translations, referenced to in the 
draft adequacy decision, which form an essential part of the Japanese legal system. The EDPB, 
therefore, renders the present opinion on the basis of the analysis of available documents in English. 
The EDPB took into account the applicable data protection framework in the European Union, including 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) protecting the right to 
private and family life as well as Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the 
European Union (hereinafter: the Charter) respectively protecting the right to private and family life, 
the right to protection of personal data and the right to an effective remedy and fair trial. In addition 
to the above, the EDPB considered the requirements of GDPR as well as looking at the relevant 
jurisprudence.  
40. The objective of this exercise is to ensure that the Japanese data protection framework is essentially 
equivalent to that of the European Union. The concept of “adequate level of protection” which already 
existed under Directive 95/46, has been further developed by the CJEU. It is important to recall the 
                                                          
13 Supplementary Rules, Annex I of the Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by Japan, 
sent to the EDPB on September 2018.-   
14 WP254,  p.3. 
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standard set by the CJEU in Schrems, namely that – while the "level of protection" in the third country 
must be "essentially equivalent" to that guaranteed in the EU – "the means to which that third country 
has recourse, in this connection, for the purpose of such a level of protection may differ from those 
employed within the [EU]"15. Therefore, the objective is not to mirror point by point the European 
legislation, but to establish the essential and core requirements of the legislation under examination. 
Adequacy can be achieved through a combination of rights for the data subjects and obligations on 
those who process data, or who exercise control over such processing and supervision by independent 
bodies. However, data protection rules are only effective, if they are enforceable and followed in 
practice. It is therefore necessary to consider not only the content of rules applicable to personal data 
transferred to a third country or an international organization, but also the system in place to ensure 
the effectiveness of such rules. Efficient enforcement mechanisms are of paramount importance to 
the effectiveness of data protection rules16. 
2.3 General comments and concerns 
2.3.1 Specificities of this type of adequacy decision 
41. The EU-Japan adequacy is the first one to be examined against the new legal backcloth of GDPR. This 
renders the work of the EDPB all the more important in light of the effects of this draft adequacy 
decision for future adequacy applications.  
42. The EU – Japan adequacy would also be the first mutual one. When and if the EU recognises Japan as 
providing an essentially equivalent level of protection to the one of the GDPR, Japan will also issue its 
own adequacy decision under Article 24 of the APPI, recognising the EU as offering an adequate level 
of protection under the Japanese data protection framework. Thus this envisaged Japan – EU adequacy 
is of a particular nature which the EDPB has taken into account in its assessment. As mentioned above, 
the Japanese PPC has negotiated specific, stricter rules with the European Commission, applicable only 
to personal data transferred from the EU. These stricter rules are binding and enforceable according 
to the Cabinet Decision and are to be complied with by all Personal Information Handling Business 
Operators (hereafter PIHBOs) in Japan when processing personal data coming from the EU under this 
draft adequacy decision.   
43. The European Commission has therefore based its adequacy finding not only on the existing general 
Japanese data protection framework but also on these specific rules. The fact that Supplementary 
Rules were required to complement the APPI is indicative of the fact that the European Commission 
acknowledges that the Japanese data protection legislation is not, per se, essentially equivalent to the 
GDPR.  
44. In light of the above-mentioned issues, the EDPB invites the European Commission to ensure that 
this new architecture of adequacy, the first to be adopted under the GDPR, relying on Supplementary 
Rules, will be a sustainable and reliable system that will not raise practical issues regarding the 
concrete and efficient compliance by Japanese entities and enforcement by the PPC. 
2.3.2 Certainty of translations 
45. Like the European Commission, the EDPB has worked on the basis of English translations provided by 
the Japanese authorities17. The EDPB calls the European Commission to clarify that it has based its draft 
adequacy decision on the English translations received and verify the quality and certainty of these 
translations regularly.   
                                                          
15 Case C‑  362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015 (§§ 73, 74). 
16 WP254, p.2. 




2.3.3 Sectorial Adequacy 
46. The adequacy finding of this draft adequacy decision is limited to the protection of personal 
information by PIHBOs within the meaning of the APPI. This means that the adequacy is sectorial as it 
only applies to the private sector, excluding from its scope transfers of personal data between public 
authorities and bodies. Currently, the European Commission briefly mentions this specificity of the 
scope of the adequacy in recital 10 of the draft adequacy decision.  
47. The EDPB invites the European Commission to explicitly mention the sectorial nature of this 
adequacy finding in the title of the implementing decision as well as in its Article 1 in accordance 
with Article 45 (3) GDPR.   
2.3.4 Binding nature of Supplementary Rules and of PPC Guidelines 
48. Article 6 of the APPI mentions that “the government shall…take necessary legislative and other action 
so as to be able to take discreet action for protecting personal information that especially requires 
ensuring the strict implementation of its proper handling in order to seek enhanced protection of an 
individual’s rights and interests, and shall take necessary action in collaboration with the governments 
in other countries to construct an internationally conformable system concerning personal information 
through fostering cooperation with an international organization and other international framework.”  
Although the government is clearly identified in this Article of the APPI as competent to take such legal 
action, it does not refer directly to the PPC as the competent body to adopt specific rules18.  Due to 
time constraints, the EDPB was unable to gather, review and examine existing evidence on this point.  
49. In light of the importance of this issue, the EDPB takes note of the repeated commitments and 
reassurances of the European Commission and of the Japanese authorities regarding the binding and 
enforceable nature of the Supplementary Rules. The EDPB invites the European Commission to 
continuously monitor their binding nature and effective application in Japan as their legal value is 
an essential element of the EU – Japan adequacy. 
50. Moreover, the European Commission makes reference in several sections of its draft adequacy 
decision to the PPC Guidelines (Guidelines).  
51. Although the European Commission clarifies that the Guidelines provide an authoritative 
interpretation of the APPI in recital 16 of its draft adequacy decision, in the same recital it makes 
reference to the binding nature of these Guidelines: “According to the information received from the 
PPC, those Guidelines are considered as binding rules that form an integral part of the legal framework, 
to be read together with the text of the APPI, the Cabinet Order, the PPC Rules and a set of Q&A 
prepared by PPC.”19 
52. However, the understanding of the EDPB, based on the same information provided by the PPC, is that 
the Guidelines are not legally binding. Rather, they provide an ‘authoritative interpretation’ of the law. 
The PPC argues that the Guidelines are followed by PIHBOs in practice, used by the PPC for enforcing 
                                                          
18 According to an article published in July 2018, when the Supplementary Rules were in a draft, the legal binding 
nature of these Rules was likely to be the object of internal debate in the country. See Fujiwara S., Comparison 
between the EU and Japan’s Data Protection Legal Frameworks’, Jurist, vol. 1521 (July 2018): p. 19. 
19 Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 




the law against PIHBOs and used by courts when rendering their judgment. However, these elements 
do not constitute sufficient evidence that the Guidelines are legally binding norms.   
53. The EDPB would welcome clarifications in the  adequacy decision in relation to the binding nature 
of the PPC Guidelines and asks the European Commission to attentively monitor this aspect. 
54. According to the PPC, the Guidelines are followed in practice nevertheless as it is local custom. The 
PPC mentions that the Japanese courts use the PPC Guidelines to render their judgments when 
applying APPI rules. The European Commission makes reference to a court ruling20 dating from 2006 
to provide evidence that the Japanese courts base themselves on guidelines for their findings. Despite 
the fact that the EDPB was not provided with this court ruling, the EDPB would appreciate if the 
European Commission could provide, if available, a more recent court ruling, either in the field of data 
protection or in another sector where the Japanese courts have used the PPC Guidelines or other 
similar guidelines as a basis of their decision.  
2.3.5 Periodic review of the adequacy finding 
55. Article 45 (3) of the GDPR provides that a periodic review must take place at least every four years. 
According to the EDPB adequacy referential21, this is a general time frame which must be adjusted to 
each third country or international organization with an adequacy decision. Depending on the 
particular circumstances at hand, a shorter review cycle could be warranted. Also, incidents or other 
information about or changes in the legal framework in the third country or international organization 
in question might trigger the need for a review ahead of schedule. It also appears to be appropriate to 
have a first review of an entirely new adequacy decision rather soon and gradually adjust the review 
cycle depending on the outcome. 
56. Taking into account a number of factors, including the fact that the APPI entered into force in 2017, 
that the PPC was established in 2016 and that there is no information nor evidence on the practical 
application of the Supplementary Rules yet, the EDPB invites the European Commission to conduct a 
review of this adequacy finding (at least) every two years and not every four years as suggested in 
the current draft adequacy decision.   
2.3.6 International commitments entered into by Japan 
57. According to Article 45 (2) (c) of the GDPR and the adequacy referential22, when assessing the adequacy 
of the level of protection of a third country, the European Commission shall take into account, among 
others, the international commitments the third country has entered into, or other obligations arising 
from the third country's participation in multilateral or regional systems in particular in relation to the 
protection of personal data, as well as the implementation of such obligations. Furthermore the third 
country's accession to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (“Convention 108+”23 and its 
Additional Protocol should be taken into account. 
58. In this regard, the EDPB notes that Japan is an observer of the Consultative Committee of Convention 
108+.   
                                                          
20 Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by Japan, as sent to the EDPB on November 13, 2018, 
page 5, footnote 16, “Osaka District Court, decision of 19 May 2006, Hanrei Jiho, Vol. 1948, p. 122. 
21 WP254, p.3. 
22 WP254, p.2. 
23 Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, Convention 108+, 
18 May 2018. 
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2.3.7 Powers of DPAs24 to bring actions concerning the validity of an adequacy decision 
before a court 
59. The EDPB underlines that although recital 179 of the draft adequacy decision only mentions cases 
where a DPA has received a complaint questioning the compatibility of an adequacy decision with the 
fundamental rights of the individual to privacy and data protection, this statement is to be understood 
as an example of situations, where a DPA can bring the matter before a national court, which could 
also be possible in the absence of a complaint, rather than as a restriction to the powers provided to 
DPAs under the GDPR and national laws of the Member States in this regard. Indeed, the provisions of 
the GDPR include both the power to suspend data transfers even when based on an adequacy decision 
and to bring an action concerning the validity of an adequacy decision, are not limited to cases where 
they have received a complaint, should their national law grant them the power to do so more broadly 
and independently from a complaint, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the GDPR.  
60. The EDPB invites the European Commission to clarify in its draft adequacy decision that the power 
of supervisory authorities to bring an action against the validity of an adequacy decision following a 
complaint is just an illustration of the broader powers of DPAs following from the GDPR, which 
include the power to suspend transfers and to bring an action concerning the validity of an adequacy 
decision in the absence of a complaint should their national law provide it.   
3 COMMERCIAL ASPECTS 
3.1 Content principles 
61. Chapter 3 of the Adequacy Referential is dedicated to the “Content Principles”. A third country’s or 
international organisation’s system must contain them in order to regard the level of protection 
provided as essentially equivalent to the one guaranteed by EU legislation. The EDPB acknowledges 
the fact that the Japanese legal system pursues a different approach to that of the GDPR in order to 
give effect to the right to privacy. Although the right to privacy is not enshrined in the Japanese 
Constitution per se, it has been recognised as a constitutional right via case law as also referenced in 
the European Commission’s decision25.  
62. Especially due to the fact that the Japanese approach noticeably differs from the European one, it has 
to be observed carefully whether, not only single aspects, but the system as a whole ultimately 
provides an “essentially equivalent” level of protection. This means, that potential “shortcomings” 
concerning one content principle might be compensated by some other aspects providing adequate 
checks and balances. 
3.1.1 Concepts 
63. Based on the adequacy referential, basic data protection concepts and/or principles should exist in the 
third country’s legal framework. Although these do not have to mirror the GDPR terminology, they 
should reflect and be consistent with the concepts enshrined in the European data protection law. For 
example, the GDPR includes the following important concepts: “personal data”, “processing of 
personal data”, “data controller”, “data processor”, “recipient” and “sensitive data”26.  
                                                          
24 Case C‑  362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015. 
25 The EDPB has not been provided with the English translation of this Court decision. See Commission 
Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council 
on the adequate protection of personal data by Japan, as sent to the EDPB on November 13, 2018, footnote 9  
26 WP254, p.4. 
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64. The APPI also includes a number of definitions such as, among others, those of “personal information”, 
“personal data”, “personal information handling business operator”. However, it seems that the APPI 
does not include a definition of the term “handling of personal data” which is similar to the term 
“processing of personal data”.  
65. Regarding the definition of the term “handling of personal data”, the PPC provided written answers to 
the EDPB’s question on this definition. The European Commission quoted this answer to the draft 
Commission decision “While the APPI does not use the term “processing”, it relies on the equivalent 
concept of “handling” which, according to the information received by the PPC, covers “any act on 
personal data” including the acquisition, input, accumulation, organisation, storage, 
editing/processing, renewal, output, reassure, output, utilization, or provision of personal 
information.”27 
66. However, since the text of reference for this definition has not been provided, the EDPB invites the 
European Commission to closely monitor that the definition of the abovementioned concept, as 
provided by the PPC, is effectively followed in practice.  
3.1.1.1 Concept of data processor and obligations of a “trustee” 
67. As mentioned above, the adequacy referential requires that basic data protection concepts and/or 
principles should exist in the third country’s legal framework.  
68. The APPI includes a definition of a “personal information handling business operator” which according 
to the European Commission comprises both the terms of a data controller and a data processor as 
provided by the GDPR and does not distinguish between the two28. However, the APPI also includes a 
term “trustee” in its Article 22, which in some ways resembles the term of a data processor under the 
GDPR.  
69. As explained by the PPC in its answers provided to the EDPB, and also included in the European 
Commission’s draft adequacy decision, a trustee is considered as the equivalent of a data processor 
under the GDPR – entrusted with the handling of personal data by a PIHBO. This trustee has the same 
obligations and rights as any PIHBO, including the ones of the Supplementary Rules for personal data 
transferred from the EU. The PIHBO that entrusts the handling of personal data to a trustee is bound 
to “exercise necessary and appropriate supervision”29 over the trustee.  
70.  The EDPB invites the European Commission to explain the trustee’s status and obligations when the 
trustee changes the purposes and means of processing and clarify whether the data subject’s 
consent remains a necessary condition for such change of purpose or determination of means30. 
                                                          
27 Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by Japan, as sent to the EDPB on November 13, 2018, 
recital 17. 
28 Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by Japan, as sent to the EDPB on November 13, 2018, 
recital 35. 
29 Article 22 of the Amended Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI), put into effect on May 30, 
2017. 
30 Art. 23 para 5 (i) APPI. See also section on the transparency principle below.  
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3.1.1.2 Concept of retained personal data 
71. The APPI contains the concept of “retained personal data” which is considered to be a sub-category of 
personal data. According to the APPI, the provisions relating to the data subject’s rights31only apply to 
retained personal data.  The definition of retained personal data is included in Article 2(7) of the APPI.  
72. Retained personal data are the personal data  other than those that (i) are set to be deleted within a 
period of no longer than 6 months32 or that (ii) fall under the exceptions of Article 4 of the Cabinet 
Order and that are likely to harm the public or other interests if their presence or absence is made 
known.  
73. The Supplementary Rule (2) provides that “personal data received from the EU based on an adequacy 
decision is required to be handled as retained personal data irrespective of the period within which it is 
set to be deleted.” 
74. However, personal data falling under the exceptions of Article 4 of the Cabinet Order will not be 
required to be handled as retained personal data and that data subject rights will not apply.  
75. Article 23 of the GDPR provides that, like Article 4 of the Cabinet Order, Union or Member State law 
to which the data controller/processor is subject to, may restrict the scope of the obligations applicable 
to him and the rights available to the data subject. This can be done by way of a legislative measure. 
These restrictions need to respect the essence of the fundamental right and freedoms and is a 
necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society.  
76. Regarding the substance of the exceptions provided for in Article 4 of the Cabinet Order, the EDPB has 
not been provided with sufficient documentation on these limitations or additional elements to clarify 
the scope of these provisions33. The EDPB is not in a position to assess whether these limitations to the 
rights of data subjects are limited to what would be considered strictly necessary and proportionate 
under EU law, and would thus be essentially equivalent to the rights provided to the EU data subjects. 
77. Due to lack of some relevant documents, the EDPB would also welcome reassurances by the 
European Commission, if restrictions to the rights of individuals (in particular, rights of access, 
rectification and objection) are necessary and proportionate in a democratic society and respect the 
essence of fundamental rights.  
78. An essential requirement under the GDPR is that personal data are protected throughout their whole 
“life cycle”.  
79. Taking into account the fact that the Supplementary Rules only apply to personal data transferred from 
the EU, the EDPB would appreciate receiving further information about the practical implementation 
of these rules by PIHBOs, especially when these data are further communicated to another PIHBO after 
their first transmission to Japan.  
80. The European Commission has clarified in recital 15 of its draft adequacy decision that PIHBOs 
receiving and/or further processing personal data from the EU will be under a legal obligation to 
comply with the Supplementary Rules and that in order to do so they will need to ensure that they can 
identify such personal data throughout their “life-cycle”.  
                                                          
31 Articles 27-30 of the APPI.  
32 Amendment to the Cabinet Order to Enforce the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (Cabinet Order), 
put into effect May 30, 2017,  Article 5.  
33 The EDPB has not been provided with the Supreme Court decisions referred to in recital 53 of the draft 
adequacy decision.  
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81. In its answers, The PPC34has explained that such identification will be made by using technical methods 
(tagging) or organisational methods (storing the data originating from the EU in a dedicated database).  
82. In footnote 14 of its draft adequacy decision, the European Commission explains that PIHBOs must 
record the information on the origin of the EU data for as long as necessary in order to be able to 
comply with the Supplementary Rules. This is also enshrined in Article 26 (1), (3) and (4) of the APPI 
which states that a PIHBO is under the obligation to confirm and record the source of these data and 
all the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of these data. 
83. However, the EDPB notes that Article 18 of the PPC Rules35 specifies that the record keeping obligations 
of PIHBOs are limited to a maximum of three years for cases that fall outside the specific record keeping 
methods described in Article 16 of the PPC Rules (using a written document, electromagnetic record 
or microfilm). This is also stated by the European Commission in recital 71 of its draft adequacy 
decision: “As specified in Article 18 of the PPC Rules, those records must be preserved for a period of 
one to three years, depending on the circumstances”.  
84. Even if, as the European Commission states in footnote 14 of its draft adequacy decision, PIHBOs are 
not prohibited to keep records regarding the origin of the data for longer than three years, in order to 
be able to fulfil their obligations under Supplementary Rule (2), this is neither clearly reflected in the 
Japanese legislation nor in the Supplementary Rules. The EDPB considers that there is a risk that 
PIHBOs will in fact comply with Article 18 of the PPC Rules even when they process data originating 
from the EU. This is mainly because there is currently, to the understanding of the EDPB and based on 
available documents, no provision putting PIHBOs under such an obligation to comply with the 
Supplementary Rules instead. This would result in data transferred from the EU to no longer being 
protected by the additional protections included in the Supplementary Rules.  
85. The EDPB invites the European Commission to closely monitor the effective protection of personal 
data transferred from the EU to Japan based on the draft adequacy decision, throughout their whole 
life-cycle even though the Japanese legislation imposes a record keeping obligation of the origin of 
the data for a maximum of three years. 
3.1.2 Grounds for lawful and fair processing for legitimate purposes 
86. According to the adequacy referential, in line with the GDPR, data must be processed in a lawful, fair 
and legitimate manner36. The legal basis, under which personal data may be lawfully, fairly and 
legitimately processed, should be set out in a sufficiently clear manner. The European framework 
acknowledges several such legitimate grounds including, for example, provisions in national law, the 
consent of the data subject, performance of a contract or legitimate interest of the data controller or 
of a third party which does not override the interests of the individual.  
87. Under the APPI, consent plays a central role in the Japanese data protection legal system. Consent is 
the central legal basis for the processing of personal data in Japan, and also one of the main legal basis 
for transfers of personal data from Japan to a third country. In addition, consent is required for an 
alteration of the purpose of the processing.  
88. According to Supplementary Rule (3), the legal basis for the processing of personal data transferred 
from the EU to Japan will be the legal basis for which the data is transferred to Japan. If the PIHBO 
                                                          
34 Annex III of the present Opinion.  
35 Enforcement Rules for the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (PPC Rules), put into effect May 30, 
2017, Article 16. 
36 WP254, p.4. 
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wishes to process further these data for a different purpose he needs to obtain the consent of the data 
subject in advance.  
89. The EDPB considers that the quality of consent, especially due to its central role in the Japanese legal 
framework, has to comply with the fundamental requirements of the notion of consent, i.e. according 
to EU law, a “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s 
wishes…”. The data subject can withdraw such consent as an essential safeguard to ensure the free 
will of the data subject throughout the time37. The right to withdrawal, as a mandatory element of 
consent, appears to be missing in the Japanese legal framework. Indeed, according to the PPC 
guidelines38 the withdrawal is merely “desirable” and conditional to the “characteristics, size and the 
status of the business activities”. 
3.1.3 The transparency principle 
90. Based on Article 5 of the GDPR, transparency is a fundamental principle of the EU data protection 
system39. The adequacy referential explicitly names “transparency” as one of the content principles to 
be taken into account when evaluating the essentially equivalent level of protection provided for by a 
third country. The transparency and fairness principle strives to ensure that the data subject has 
control over his/her data and, for this purpose, information shall be provided to the data subject in a 
proactive manner as a rule. In the case of the Privacy Shield, the Article 29 Working Party40 in their 
opinion 1/2016 made reference to Annex II, II 1 b of the Privacy Shield agreement (notice to the 
individual) and stated that, if the data is not collected directly, an organisation should notify the data 
subject “at the point the data is recorded by the Shield organisation” (section 2.2.1.a). Having the 
privacy policy publicly available is an additional criterion (see section 2.2.1.b). Hence, already under 
Directive 95/46/EC it was deemed necessary to directly inform the data subject. 
91. A first concern is raised regarding the modality of information provided to the data subject under the 
APPI. According to Article 27 (1) of the APPI, a PIHBO is obliged to provide the information described 
in Article 27 (1) APPI by putting it “into a state where a principal can know”. However, this wording 
does not make  clear to what extent the PIHBO has to take positive measures to genuinely inform the 
data subject.  
92. The EDPB invites the Commission to clarify the meaning of the term “can know” and whether the 
APPI provides as a rule the obligation to genuinely inform data subjects.   
93. Moreover, according to the adequacy referential, restrictions to the information to be provided to the 
data subject may exist, similar to Article 23 GDPR. On a similar vein, Article 14 (5) of the GDPR provides 
for an exception to the right to be informed when the information is likely to render impossible or 
seriously impair the achievement of the processing. However, even in this case, the controller shall 
provide some sort of information as, for instance, by making “generalised” information publicly 
                                                          
37 GDPR, Article 4(11). For more information see also relevant guidelines of the EDPB on consent WP259, 10 April 
2018.  
38 Data Protection Legal and Technical Research and Analysis Consortium (DPC), An assessment of the level of 
protection of personal data provided under Japanese law, p. 46: "Further, from the viewpoint of protection of 
rights and interests of a principal such as consumers, it is desirable, in case of having received a demand from a 
principal for the retained personal data, to further respond to the principal’s demand in such a way as stopping 
etc. of direct-mail sending or voluntarily fulfilling a utilisation cease etc. considering the characteristics, size and 
the status of the business activities”. 
39 WP 254, chapter 3, point 7, p. 5; see also recital (39) GDPR. 
40 This Working Party was set up under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC. It was an independent European advisory 
body on data protection and privacy. Its tasks are described in Article 30 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 15 of 
Directive 2002/58/EC. The WP29 has now become the EDPB.  
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available. Moreover, when the risk ceases to exist the data subject shall be notified41. These aspects 
are important in order to ensure the fundamental principle of fairness.  
94. Under Article 23 of the APPI, a PIHBO generally has to give in advance information to the data subject 
about providing his/her data to a third party either implicitly when obtaining his/her consent or 
explicitly by an opt-out notification. The EDPB understands that there is no notification to the data 
subject, informing him/her of the fact that his/her data are not retained personal data under the APPI 
because falling under the exceptions of Article 4 of the Cabinet Order. As a result, they will not be able 
to benefit from their rights in full. The data subjects are not informed in the cases of Article 18(4) APPI 
either.  
95. The EDPB acknowledges that the rights may be restricted for legitimate objectives pursued by the 
PIHBO and the state authorities. At the same time, the EDPB considers that there should be at least 
a general information upfront on the possibility of the restriction of the rights for the objectives 
referred to the law and that the data subject should be notified when the risks for which the 
information is restricted cease to exist.  
96. Finally, other aspects of transparency are developed further below. These refer to the risks the transfer 
to a third country entails42 and the information on the logic of processing in the context of automated 
decision making, including profiling.43 
3.1.4 Restrictions on onward transfers 
97. The EDPB welcomes the efforts made by the Japanese authorities and the European Commission to 
enhance the level of protection for onward transfers in Supplementary Rule (4), which excludes that 
personal data transferred from the EU is further transferred to a third country on the basis of APEC-
CBPRs. In addition, the EDPB recognises that in in recitals 177 and 184 of its new draft of the adequacy 
decision, the European Commission committed itself to suspend the adequacy decision when onward 
transfers no longer ensure the continuity of protection. However, the EDPB would like to raise two 
points regarding these transfers of EU personal data from Japan to third countries.  
98. The use of consent as a basis for data transfers from Japan to a third country in the Japanese legal 
system raises concerns as the EDPB considers that the information given to the EU data subject prior 
to consenting seems not to be comprehensive.  
99. Article 24 APPI prohibits the transfer of personal data to a third party outside the territory of Japan 
without the prior consent of the individual concerned. Supplementary Rule (4) stipulates that EU data 
subjects have to be provided with information on the circumstances surrounding the transfer 
necessary to make a decision on his/her consent. 
100. The European Commission concludes in its draft adequacy decision that Supplementary Rule (4) 
secures a particular well informed consent of the EU data subject44 as he/she will be advised of the 
fact that the data will be transferred abroad and of the specific country of destination. This would allow 
the data subject to assess the risk for privacy involved with the transfer. 
                                                          
41 Tele2, Joined Cases C 203/15 and C 698/15, judgement of the Court, 21 December 2016, rec. 121 and Digital 
Rights Ireland, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, judgement of the Court, 8 April 2014, rec. 54-62. 
42 See section 2.1.4.  
43 See section 2.1.6. 
44 Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 




101. Under the transparency principle of the adequacy referential, a certain degree of fairness shall be 
ensured when informing individuals. In the context of onward transfers based on consent, the EDPB is 
of the opinion that to ensure such adequate degree of fairness data subjects should be explicitly 
informed about the possible risks of such transfers arising from the absence of adequate protection in 
the third country and the absence of appropriate safeguards prior to consent. Such notice should 
include for example information that in the third country there might not be a supervisory authority 
and/or data processing principles and/or data subject rights might not be provided for in the third 
country45. For the EDPB the provision of this information is essential in order to enable the data subject 
to consent with full knowledge of these specific facts of the transfer46.  
102. Informed consent is also important regarding sectorial exclusions.  The adequacy decision does not 
cover certain types of processing by certain bodies such as universities for the processing of personal 
data for academic purposes. The EDPB’s concern here relates to the specific scenario of when data 
transferred from the EU under the adequacy decision – for example the HR data of Erasmus students 
in Japan – are then used for a different purpose falling out of the scope of the adequacy decision (e.g. 
research purposes), with the consent of the data subject, - and are therefore no longer covered by the 
additional protection provided by the Supplementary Rules.  
103. The European Commission states in recital 38 of its draft adequacy decision that such a scenario will 
fall under the context of onward transfers and that, where this takes place, the PIHBO has to provide 
the data subject with all the necessary information before obtaining his/her consent, including that 
the personal information would not fall under the protection of the APPI rules.  
104. Supplementary Rule (4) only requires the PIHBO to obtain the data subject’s consent after having been 
provided with information on the circumstances surrounding the transfer necessary for the principal 
to make a decision on his/her consent. 
105. The EDPB invites the European Commission to ensure that the information to be provided to the 
data subject “on the circumstances surrounding the transfer” should include the information about 
the possible risks of transfers arising from the absence of adequate protection in the third country 
and the absence of appropriate safeguards, or in the case of sectorial exclusions, of the absence of 
protections of the Supplementary Rules and of the APPI.  
106. Onward transfers of personal data may occur to third countries, which become subject to a possible 
later Japanese adequacy decision.  
107. Without prejudice to the derogations set forth in Article 23 para 1 of the APPI, data initially transferred 
from the EU to Japan can be then transferred from Japan to a third country without consent in two 
cases: 
 If the PIHBO and the third party recipient have together implemented measures providing a 
level of protection equivalent to the APPI read together with the Supplementary Rules by 
means of a contract, other forms of binding agreements or binding agreements within a 
corporate group47. 
                                                          
45 EDPB Guidelines 2/2018 on derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679, 25 May 2018, p.8. 
46 EDPB Guidelines 2/2018 on derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679, 25 May 2018, p.7. 
47 Supplementary Rule (4) (ii). 
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 If the third country has been recognised by the PPC under Article 24 of the APPI and Article 11 
of the PPC Rules48 as providing an equivalent level of protection to the one guaranteed in 
Japan. 
108. The EDPB evaluates Article 24 APPI as the more specific rule, which contains a derogation from the 
general rule under Article 23 APPI. Therefore, the EDPB does not share the European Commission’s 
assessment in the new last sentence of Recital 78 of the draft adequacy decision stating that even in 
those cases, the transfer to the third party remains subject to the requirement to obtain consent under 
Article 23 (1) of the APPI.  
109. Pursuant to Article 11 (1) of the PPC Rules, an adequacy decision by the PPC requires substantive 
standards equivalent to the APPI whose implementation are ensured in the third country and which 
are effectively supervised by an independent enforcement authority. Moreover, the PPC may impose 
necessary conditions to protect the rights and interests of individuals in Japan, according to Article 11 
(2) of the PPC Rules. 
110. Supplementary Rule (4) states that EU personal data can be transferred to a third country subject to a 
Japanese adequacy decision without further restrictions. But Article 44 of the GDPR regulates that any 
transfer of personal data to a third country has to fulfil the conditions laid down in Chapter V of the 
GDPR including onward transfers from the third country to another third country. The level of 
protection of natural persons whose data is transferred must not be undermined by the onward 
transfer49. Although this interpretation is in principle also shared by the European Commission in its 
draft adequacy decision50, it seems  not to be completely followed. The European Commission has 
negotiated the prohibition of data originating from the EU being transferred to a third country on the 
basis of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) – Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPRs). In the light of 
the comparative tool developed in 2014 under the framework of the EU Directive between BCR and 
CBPR showing the requirements of both systems, their convergences and differences (WP29 Opinion 
02/2014), the EDPB has concerns about the use of CBPRs as an onward transfer tool for personal data 
transferred from the EU to countries outside of Japan.  
111. In contrast, onward transfers of personal data transferred from the EU to Japan on the basis of a 
Japanese adequacy decision, seem to be accepted by the European Commission, without the 
possibility for the PPC to impose the Supplementary Rules as conditions to protect the rights and 
interests of EU individuals, if necessary. The EDPB deduces from Article 44 of the GDPR that the 
enhanced protection of data being transferred from the EU to Japan foreseen in the Supplementary 
Rules has always to be extended when  personal data transferred from the EU to Japan is further 
transferred to a third country, if the data protection framework in that country is not recognised as 
essentially equivalent to the GDPR.   
112. Hence, the EDPB invites the European Commission to take over its monitoring role and to ensure the 
level of protection of EU data is maintained or to consider suspension of this adequacy decision if 
personal data transferred from the EU to Japan is further transferred to third countries subject to a 
                                                          
48 Enforcement Rules for the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, 30 May 2017. An English translation 
of the new Article 11 was communicated by the EU Commission to the EDPB, but this Article has not been 
published yet. 
49 WP 254, p.5. 
50 Commission Implementing Decision of XXXX, pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament 




possible later Japanese adequacy decision, when these third countries have not been subject of a 
previous assessment or adequacy finding of the EU. 
3.1.5 Direct marketing 
113. According to Supplementary Rule (3), a PIHBO is prohibited from processing the data for the purpose 
of direct marketing if it has been transferred from the European Union for another purpose and the 
EU data subject has not given his or her consent to the change of the utilisation purpose. 
114. According to the Adequacy referential where data are processed for the purposes of direct marketing, 
the data subject should be able to object without any charge from having his/her data processed for 
such purposes at any time. According to Article 16 of the APPI, a PIHBO is only allowed to process 
personal information if the data subject gives his or her consent. The withdrawal of consent could 
provide the same result as the privileged right to object to direct marketing.  
115. The Japanese data protection framework does not provide a privileged right of objection and as 
explained above in the section on consent, withdrawal of consent under the PPC Guidelines is merely 
desirable and conditional and can therefore not be considered to equate to a right to object at any 
time as requested under the Adequacy referential. The EDPB invites the European Commission to 
provide reassurances about the right to withdrawal of consent and to monitor cases regarding direct 
marketing. 
3.1.6 Automated decision making and profiling 
116. According to the adequacy referential, decisions based solely on automated processing (automated 
individual decision-making), including profiling, which produce legal effects or significantly affect the 
data subject, can take place only under certain conditions established in the third country legal 
framework. Therefore, every time automated decision making and profiling under the aforementioned 
circumstances is conducted, there has to be a legal ground for this.  
117. In the European framework, the conditions for automated decision making include, for example, the 
need to obtain the explicit consent51 of the data subject or the necessity of such a decision for the 
conclusion of a contract. If the decision does not comply with such conditions as laid down in the third 
country legal framework, the data subject should have the right not to be subject to it. Furthermore, 
the law of the third country should, in any case, provide for necessary safeguards, including the right 
to be informed about the specific reasons underlying the decision and the logic involved to correct 
inaccurate or incomplete information and to contest the decision where it has been adopted on an 
incorrect factual basis. 
118. The Commission decision only refers to banking sector where sectoral rules52 regarding automated 
decisions would apply. The Comprehensive Guidelines for Supervision over Major Banks mentioned in 
recital 93 of the draft adequacy decision indicate that the concerned individual has to be provided with 
specific explanations on the reasons for the rejection of a request to conclude a loan agreement.  
119. The argumentations of the European Commission referring to the draft adequacy decision (Recital 94), 
that the absence of specific rules on automated decision making in the APPI is unlikely to affect the 
level of protection seems (for instance) do not to take into account the case in which an EU-transferred 
                                                          
51 For critical remarks to the concept of consent in the Japanese data protection legal framework see: 2.1. General 
and 2.2.8. Direct marketing. 




personal data is subsequently processed by another Japanese data controller (different from the 
original Japanese data importer).   
120. It appears therefore, that there are no general rules applicable across sectors in Japan governing 
automated decision making and profiling.  
121. The EDPB invites the European Commission to monitor cases related to automated decision making 
and profiling.  
3.2  Procedural and enforcement mechanisms 
122. Based on the criteria set in the adequacy referential, the EDPB has analysed the following aspects of 
the Japanese data protection and legal framework as covered under the draft adequacy decision: the 
existence and effective functioning of an independent supervisory authority; the existence of a system 
ensuring a good level of compliance and a system of access to appropriate redress mechanisms 
equipping EU individuals with the means to exercise their rights and seek redress without encountering 
cumbersome barriers to administrative and judicial redress.  
123. Building on the parameters established by the CJEU in the Schrems case53 and those outlined in recital 
104 and Article 45 of the GDPR, the EDPB finds that, although a system consistent with the European 
one exists in Japan, this system may be difficult to access in practice for EU individuals, whose data will 
be transferred under this adequacy decision in light of the existence of language and institutional 
barriers.  
124. The sections below will examine the above mentioned aspects of the Japanese framework before 
highlighting some recommendations for the Commission. 
3.2.1 Competent independent Supervisory Authority 
125. The PPC was established on the 1 January 2016 following the amendments of the APPI of 2015, 
replacing its predecessor – the Specific Personal Information Protection Commission (established in 
2013 under the My Number Act). Although a young organization, since its establishment, the PPC has 
put considerable efforts into building the required infrastructure to accommodate the implementation 
of the amended APPI. Noticeable among these are the establishment of the PPC’s rules, the PPC 
Guidelines to give guidance to PIHBOs on the interpretation of the APPI, the publication of a PPC Q&A54 
document and the setting up of a helpline to advise business operators and citizens on data protection 
provisions as well as of a mediation service to handle complaints.  
126. The establishment and functioning of the PPC is regulated in chapter V of the APPI. Although the PPC 
falls within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, article 62 mandates that the PPC exercises its 
function independently. The EDPB welcomes the clarification made by the European Commission in 
the amended draft of the adequacy decision circulated on 13 November 2018 to further describe the 
degree to which the PPC is free from internal and external influences.  
3.2.2 The data protection system must ensure a good level of compliance 
127. The draft adequacy decision undertakes a comprehensive examination of the powers that the PPC is 
equipped with under Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the APPI to ensure the monitoring and enforcement of 
the legislation. Article 40 empowers the PPC to request PIHBOs to submit reports and documentation 
relating to processing operations as well as to carry out on-site inspections. Under Article 42, the PPC 
has the power – when recognising that it is necessary to protect individual rights or where finding a 
                                                          
53 Case 362/14 (2015) Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, (para. 73 and 74).  
54 This document was not provided by the European Commission to the EDPB in English.  
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violation of the provisions of the law – to issue recommendations and, those failing, orders to PIHBOs 
to suspend the act of violation or take necessary measures to rectify the violation. 
128. In October 2018, the PPC took one of its first actions under article 41 of the amended APPI and issued 
‘guidance’ to a PIHBO, advising the company to strengthen its’ security measures and to effectively 
supervise applications providers whilst giving clear and easy to understand explanations to users on 
how their personal information is used, and obtain consent beforehand when the information is shared 
with a third party as well as respond properly to users' request for erasure of their information. In the 
answers provided to the EDPB55, PPC officials advised that the company has announced it will 
cooperate and that, when the company fail to do so, it will render the company with a 
‘recommendation’ under Article 42(1) of the APPI.  
129. The investigation conducted by the PPC on the above mentioned PIHBO is a very positive indicator of 
the Japanese supervisory authority’s efforts to ensure a good level of compliance in the country.  
130. Although there are improvements in respect to the framework in place prior to the 2015 amendments, 
the EDPB notices that the PPC has fewer powers than European DPA under the GDPR, especially in 
relation to enforcement. Administrative fines56, for example, are quite mild. The European 
Commission’s decision emphasises in recital 108 that, in cases of non-compliance or some violations 
of the APPI, criminal sanctions are in place and that the PPC Chair may forward cases to the public 
prosecutor. However, the European Commission’s decision does not account for the fact that public 
prosecution in Japan is discretional and may sometimes be subject to lengthy review processes57. In 
addition, the penalty of imprisonment (with or without labour) associated with violations of the APPI 
pursuant the provisions in Chapter VII may be difficult to execute because directed at natural persons 
and, in any case, not punishing the PIHBO as a legal entity failing to exercise its accountability 
obligations.     
131. In light of the above, the EDPB invites the European Commission to closely monitor the effectiveness 
of sanctions and relevant remedies in the Japanese data protection system. 
3.2.3 The data protection system must provide support and help to individual data subjects 
in the exercise of their rights and appropriate redress mechanisms 
132. The PPC provides extensive information and guidelines on its website aimed at raising awareness 
among PIHBOs in relation to their obligations and responsibilities under the data protection framework 
as well as a Helpline to provide information and support to Japanese citizens regarding their individual 
rights under the APPI. The website has also a section, called the ‘Children’s room’, explicitly aimed at 
a children’s and young people audience. The EDPB observes that this information – along with the 
Helpline support, guidance and Q&A documentations – is available in Japanese58. Therefore, the EDPB 
strongly believes, it would be beneficial if the PPC could provide a dedicated page on the English 
version of its website aimed at providing information about their individual rights under the Japanese 
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data protection framework and under the Supplementary Rules to EU individuals whose data will be 
transferred to Japan under the European Commission’s adequacy decision.  
133. The EDPB welcomes the clarification made by the European Commission in recital 104 of the amended 
draft adequacy decision circulated on 13 November 2018 regarding the mediation service managed by 
the PPC pursuant Article 61(ii) of the APPI. However, the EDPB would like to raise three points in 
relation to this. Firstly, the mediation service is not publicized on the English version of the PPC’s 
website. Secondly, the service is accessible only via phone and available in Japanese. Finally, mediation 
is merely a facilitative process not leading to a binding agreement between the parties which has 
implications for the effectiveness of the redress options available to data subjects59.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
134. Finally, the EDPB notices that the draft adequacy decision places emphasis on the remedies available 
through civil law action as well as criminal proceedings, but does not acknowledge the existence of 
institutional barriers to litigation in Japan such as legal costs (legal fees are split equally between 
plaintiff and defendant, regardless of which party wins the proceedings60), dearth of lawyers in the 
country61, the fact that foreign lawyers are not allowed to practice domestic law as well as the burden 
of proof requirement under Tort Law. The EDPB fears that these factors may – in practice – hinder 
individuals’ access to justice and jeopardise their right to pursue legal remedies rapidly and without 
bearing prohibitive costs.  
135. In light of the above, the EDPB is concerned that there is a risk that EU individuals may have 
difficulties accessing administrative and judicial redress and, therefore, would welcome if the 
European Commission could discuss with the PPC the possibility of setting up an online service, at least 
in English, aimed at providing support to, and handle complaints of62, EU individuals. In addition, the 
EDPB would welcome the possibility of allowing EU DPAs to act as intermediaries for EU data subject 
complaints with organisations operating in Japan and the PPC.  
4 ON THE ACCESS BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO THE DATA 
TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN 
136. The intention of the COM is to recognise, through the adequacy decision, that “Japan ensures an 
adequate level of protection for personal data transferred from the European Union to personal 
information handling business operators in Japan”, as stated in Art. 1 of the draft adequacy decision. 
In line with Art. 45 (2) GDPR, the COM has also analysed the limitations and safeguards as regards 
access to personal data by public authorities. This chapter focuses on the assessment of the access to 
personal data by law enforcement authorities and by other government entities for the purpose of 
national security. The analysis of the EDPB is based on the draft adequacy decision, its Annex II, in 
which the Japanese government provides an overview of the relevant legal framework, and the 
Japanese legal texts, to the extent they were provided by the COM. Therefore, in the specific context 
of this assessment, the EDPB has taken into account elements concerning Japanese laws which are not 
                                                          
59 Kojima T., Civil Procedure and ADR in Japan, Chuo University Press, 2004; and Menkel-Meadow C., Dispute 
Processing and Conflict Resolution: Theory, Practice and Policy, Ashgate (2003) (ed.).  
60 Wagatsuma (2012), ‘Recent Issues of Cost and Fee Allocation in Japanese Civil Procedure’ in Reimann (ed.), 
Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure – Ius Gentium; comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice Vol. 11, 
pp. 195 – 200.  
61 According to the latest figures, the number of lawyers in Japan is 38,980 (roughly 290 layers per one million 
people [Japan Federation of Bar Association] (2017), White Paper on Attorneys: p. 8 – 9. 
62 Similar to the one envisaged in Annex II of this adequacy decision for complaints from EU residents regarding 
access to their data by Japanese public authorities. 
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part of the findings by the European Commission, but that are relevant to assess the conditions and 
safeguards under which Japanese public authorities are allowed to access personal data transferred 
from the European Union. 
4.1 Law enforcement access to data 
4.1.1 Procedures for accessing data in the field of criminal law 
137. The draft adequacy decision presents three ways foreseen under Japanese law for law enforcement 
authorities to access data in Japan: 
4.1.1.1 Access requests with a court warrant 
138. The draft adequacy decision states that for government access in Japan, and especially for criminal law 
enforcement authorities to request access to electronic evidence in the context of criminal 
investigations, they always need to have a warrant, unless they use the voluntary disclosure procedure 
– see below. 
4.1.1.1.1 Requirement of “adequate cause”, necessity and proportionality of the warrants 
139. The EDPB acknowledges that under the Japanese constitution any collection of personal data by 
compulsory means must be based on a court warrant. More specifically, the draft adequacy decision 
indicates that in all cases of “searches and seizures”, court warrants have to be issued for “adequate 
cause”, which the Supreme Court considers only exists where the individual concerned (suspect or 
accused) is considered to have committed an offence and the search and seizure is necessary for the 
criminal investigation. The COM here references the Supreme Court judgment of 18 March 1969, case 
N. 100 (1968(Shi)).). The EDPB recalls that under the CJEU’s case law63 only a court, and not prosecutors 
for instance, can authorize the collection of traffic and location data in particular.  
140. Also in light of the CJEU jurisprudence, according to which access to data may be subject to a warrant, 
as in Tele2, the EDPB regrets that no additional information were provided in order to assess how the 
criteria for assessing the necessity of a warrant – gravity of the offense and how it was committed ; 
value and importance of the seized materials as evidence ; probability of concealment or destruction 
of seized materials ; extent of the disadvantages caused by a seizure ; other related conditions – and 
the concept of “adequate cause” derived from the Constitution are applied in practice. Therefore, the 
EDPB invites the Commission to monitor if the issuing of warrants meets the criteria set out by the 
CJEU in practice. 
4.1.1.1.2 Types of crimes for which warrants can be issued 
141. The warrant procedure applies only whenever a “compulsory investigation” is carried out. In principle, 
these warrants can only be issued in cases where a violation of law has occurred. In this respect, the 
EDPB notes the recently adopted “Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime 
Proceeds” on 15 June 2017 in the context of adherence of Japan to the UN international Convention 
on Transnational Crime (UNTOC)64. In the absence of an English available version of this legislation, 
and given the requirement under EU law that some data are collected only in the context of 
investigation, detection or prosecution of serious crimes65, as well as given concerns expressed by 
several commentators, including UN Special Rapporteur Joseph Cannataci66, concerning the wide 
scope of application, and which relies on a definition of “organized criminal group” reportedly vague 
                                                          
63 See cases 203/15 and C 293/12 and C 594/12 of the CJEU. 
64 See: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html . 
65 See joint cases C 293/12 and C 594/12 and case C 203/15. 
66 UN Special rapporteur on the right to privacy, as well as Graham Greenleaf, UNSW Law Researcher. 
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and too broad, the EDPB is not in a position to conclude that access to electronic evidence under the 
relevant Japanese legislation is limited to the thresholds provided by EU law.  
142. It has also to be noted that for some types of offences, the Prefectural Police is competent and that 
they have their specific police ordinances. The internal rules applicable to the Prefectural police were 
not available to the EDPB.  
143. According to the draft Adequacy decision, the collection of electronic information in the area of 
criminal law enforcement falls under the responsibility of the Prefectural Police. 
4.1.1.2 Wiretapping warrants 
144. Annex II of the draft adequacy indicates that the Act on Wiretapping for Criminal Investigation provides 
for specificities for the interception of communications. This legislation was provided very late which 
did not allow for an in-depth analysis. Therefore, although many safeguards seem to be provided 
within this legal framework, the EDPB is not in a position to assess whether the conditions provided in 
this piece of legislation are surrounded by guarantees substantially equivalent to those required in the 
EU both by the Charter as interpreted by the CJEU and by the ECHR as interpreted by the Strasbourg 
Court. 
4.1.1.3 The “voluntary disclosure” procedure based on enquiry sheet 
145. This non-compulsory form of cooperation allows public authorities to ask controllers (except 
telecommunications carriers) to provide them with data they have. Non-compliance with the request 
cannot be enforced.  It remains unclear which authorities can use this type of procedure, but it appears 
limited to those investigating crimes. 
4.1.1.3.1 Conditions to issue “enquiry sheets” 
146. The EDPB acknowledges that the Japanese Supreme Court, by reference to the Constitution, has 
framed limitations to the use “voluntary disclosures”67. It appears from the draft adequacy decision 
that concretely a “voluntary disclosure” may only be asked by the competent authorities through the 
issuance of an “enquiry sheet”. Sending such an “enquiry sheet” is said to be permissible only as part 
of a criminal investigation, and thus to always presuppose a concrete suspicion of an already 
committed crime. Such investigations are generally carried out by the Prefectural Police, where the 
limitations pursuant to Article 2(2) of the Police Law apply, which means it should be relevant for the 
Police activities. However, the EDPB seeks further clarification as to the concrete contours of the 
criteria allowing to issue an enquiry sheet (such as case law illustrating the application of these criteria), 
and the relationship between the voluntary disclosure procedure and the seizure of data on the basis 
of a warrant. Indeed, it appears that even where data could not be obtained through the voluntary 
procedure, they could still be obtained with a warrant if indispensable for the investigative 
authorities68. 
4.1.1.3.2 Available case law on the limitations to the use of voluntary disclosure 
147. The cases quoted in the draft adequacy decision69 to illustrate limitations to the use of voluntary 
disclosure procedures relate to cases, where the accused person was either photographed or filmed 
in the public space by the police directly, and therefore give limited indications as to situations where 
the competent authorities can ask a controller to disclose data, in particular with regards to the criteria 
listed under Annex II concerning the “appropriateness of methods”, which seems to concern the 
                                                          
67 See Annex II page 8. 
68 See Annex II page 7. 
69 See Annex II page 8 – two Supreme Court decisions of December 24th, 1969 (1965 (A) No.1187) and April 
15th, 2008 (2007 (A) No.839). 
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assessment of whether voluntary investigation is “appropriate” or reasonable in order to achieve the 
purpose of the investigation. The same can be said concerning the general criteria of “whether it can 
be considered reasonable in accordance with socially accepted conventions” to assess the legality of 
voluntary investigations. Furthermore, the National Police Agency, which is the federal authority in 
charge of all matters concerning the criminal police, issued instructions to the Prefectural Police on 
the “proper use if written inquiries in investigative matters”. Among others, the chief investigator must 
receive internal approval from a high-ranking official. The EDPB has no information if these instructions 
are binding. Nevertheless the EDPB states, that the use of this procedure has to be proportionate or 
necessary. 
4.1.1.3.3 Rights and obligations of the controllers in the context of voluntary disclosure 
148. In addition, it is for the controllers to consent to provide data (but there appears to be no obligation 
on their part to seek the consent of data subjects or to inform them), where these requests do not 
conflict with other legal obligations (such as confidentiality obligations). The report provided by the 
Commission seems to indicate that after a high rate of compliance, controllers have started taking into 
account data protection of their customers’ and thus have started answering less frequently to these 
requests. 
149. It also remains unclear if controllers have any incentive to comply with the requests (for instance, if 
they have an advantage when complying, or if they are exempted from prosecution, etc). In particular, 
no mention is made of any principle such as the “non-self-incrimination principle”. 
150. The EDPB would welcome additional information, if available, figures on the number and types of 
requests, as well as on the answers provided by the controllers requested. In the absence of case law 
and figures, the EDPB invites the Commission to monitor the efficiency and concrete application of this 
procedure in practice 
151. However, the EDPB lacks case law and figures on this procedure to establish these elements. 
Consequently, the EDPB is not in a position to provide an assessment concerning the efficiency and 
concrete application of this procedure without further elements concerning the practice. 
4.1.1.4 Conclusion on procedures for accessing data for law enforcement purposes 
152. As a conclusion, the EDPB acknowledges that the principle according to which personal data can be 
compulsorily accessed by the competent authorities only when necessary and proportionate to the 
purpose, and on the basis of a warrant, corresponds to the main essential guarantees provided under 
EU and ECHR law. Following the findings above, the EDPB asks the Commission to monitor the scope 
of these measures, the scope of the voluntary disclosure procedure and the application of these 
principle by the Prefectural Police and by the Courts in the relevant case law and to monitor too, if the 
Japanese legal framework is providing the essential guarantees drawn by the CJEU on the basis of the 
Charter and the ECHR on the basis of the Convention. 
4.1.2 Oversight in the field of criminal law 
153. The draft adequacy decision as well as the Annex II present four types of oversights conducted on the 
police, ministries and public agencies. 
4.1.2.1 Judicial oversight 
4.1.2.1.1 In cases where electronic information is collected by compulsory means (search and 
seizure) 
154. According to the draft adequacy decision, in all cases where electronic information is collected by 
compulsory means (search and seizure), the police has to obtain a prior court warrant. However, there 
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is an exception to this rule. 70. Indeed, article 220 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a public 
prosecutor, its assistant or a judicial police official, when they are arresting a suspect to search or seize 
electronic information on the spot of the arrest. In this situation, there is a possibility for those 
information to be excluded as evidence by a judge.  
155. The EDPB is mindful that similar exceptions also exist under EU law. It notes that there is not always a 
judicial control in cases where electronic information is collected by compulsory means, as it is 
stipulated in the draft adequacy decision. In this context, the EDPB recalls the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR on judicial a posteriori checks.71  
4.1.2.1.2 In the case of requests for voluntary disclosure 
156. According to the draft adequacy decision, in the case of the requests for voluntary disclosure, there is 
no ex ante control by a judge. In such case, the Prefectural Police operates under the supervision of 
the public prosecutor. The draft adequacy decision mentions articles 192 (1) and 246 on the mutual 
cooperation and coordination of the prosecutors, Prefectural Public Safety Commission and Judicial 
Police Officials and exchange of information between them.  It also refers to article 193 (1) according 
to which public prosecutor may give necessary instruction to judicial police as well as setting standards 
for fair investigation. Finally, it mentions article 194 on the disciplinary actions against judicial police 
for not respecting the public prosecutors taken by the National or Prefectural Public Safety 
Commission.  
157. The EDPB acknowledges the establishment of the previous measures and the oversight conducted by 
National and Prefectural Public Safety Commission on the judicial police (see below).  
4.1.2.2 Oversight by the Public Safety Commissions of the police 
158. According to the Annex II of the draft adequacy decision, two types of commissions are exerting an 
oversight of the police. Both aim at securing democratic management and political neutrality of the 
police administration.   
4.1.2.2.1 Oversight conducted by the National Public Safety Commission 
159. Annex II of the draft adequacy decision mentioned the oversight conducted by the National Public 
Safety Commission on the NPA. The Police Law gives a list of the duties of the Commission from which 
emanates its supervisory powers (see Article 5).  
160. According to Article 4 of the Police Law, the National Public Safety Commission is established under 
the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and is composed of a chairman and five members. Article 7 
establishes some limitations to the appointment of the members of the Commission. The term of 
Office of Members of the Commission is five years and may be re-conducted one time only, as 
prescribed in Article 8. Furthermore, the Diet, appears to have a strong power over the appointment 
and the dismissal of the Commission’s member which ensure the independence of the National Public 
Safety Commission.  
161. Such legal provisions enhance the political neutrality of the National Public Safety Commission.  
4.1.2.2.2 Oversight conducted by Prefectural Public Safety Commissions 
162. The Prefectural Police is subject to the oversight of the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions 
established in each prefecture. According to Articles 2 and 36 (2) of the Police Law, the Prefectural 
Public Safety Commissions are responsible for “the protection of rights and freedom of an individual”. 
Article 38 as well as Article 42 of the Police Law list the duties of the Prefectural Public Safety 
                                                          
70 See Annex II. 
71 ECHR, Modestou v. Greece, N° 51693/13. 
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Commissions. Those Commissions also aim at securing democratic management and political 
neutrality of the police administration as stated in Article 43 (2) by issuing to the Prefectural Police 
individual cases when they consider this necessary in the context of an inspection of the activities of 
the Prefectural Police or misconduct of its personnel.  
163. However, it is unclear whether those Commissions have other powers than the inspection of police’s 
behavior. The EDPB is wondering whether the term “misconduct” is including illegal access of data and, 
in such a case, whether those Commissions are able to order the deletion of data or not.  
164. Regarding the neutrality and the independence of those Commissions, as stated in the draft adequacy 
decision72, Prefectural Public Safety Commissions are established under the jurisdiction of the 
prefectural governor who has to appoint members of the Commission with the consent of the 
prefectural assembly. Members of the Prefectural Public Safety Commission have a three years term 
and may be re-appointed up to two times. Article 39 of the Police Law enounced limitations concerning 
the appointment of the members. The draft adequacy decision also mentions the oversight of the 
Prefectural Police by local assembly, making reference of Article 100 of the Local Autonomy Act. 
However, this act was not provided to the EDPB73.  
165. Furthermore, according to Article 42 (2) and (3) of the Police Law, “No member of the Commission 
shall become concurrently a member of the assembly or the personnel in full-time service of local 
public entities or be engaged in part-time service prescribed in the provision of paragraph 1, Article 28 
(5) of the Local Public Service Law.  
166. According to the elements stated above and considering the collaboration between Prefectural Public 
Safety Commissions and National Public Safety Commission, the EDPB agrees with the draft adequacy 
decision and welcomes the neutrality and the independence of the members of the Prefectural Public 
Safety Commissions.  The EDPB understands that Prefectural Safety Commissions only have a power 
to investigate police’s behavior and do not have other supervisory powers, including the deletion of 
data collected by the prefectural police. Therefore, it appears that further clarification is needed as to 
whether the oversight conducted by Prefectural Public Safety Commissions is sufficient according the 
standards established under EU law. 
4.1.2.2.3 Oversight conducted by the Diet 
167. The draft adequacy decision74 and the Annex II75 are providing some information about the oversight 
conducted by the Diet in relation to the government, including with respect to the lawfulness of 
information collection of data by the police. Indeed, both mention the Article 62 of the Constitution 
according to which, the Diet may request the production of documents and the testimony of witnesses. 
Both are also mentioning legal provisions from the Diet Law, especially Article 104, concerning the 
powers of the Diet as well as Article 74 on the submission of written inquiries, which have to be 
answered by the Cabinet in writing within seven days as prescribed in Article 75. The draft adequacy 
decision also adds “The Diet’s role in supervising the executive is supported by reporting obligations, 
for instance pursuant to Article 29 of the Wiretapping Act”.  
168. The EDPB acknowledges the implication of the Diet in the oversight of the government and the police 
regarding the lawfulness of data collection.  
                                                          
72 See draft adequacy decision p. 31. 
73 See draft adequacy decision p. 33. 
74 See draft adequacy decision p. 30. 




4.1.2.2.4 Oversight conducted by the executive 
169. According to the Annex II of the draft adequacy, on the one hand, the Minister or Head of each ministry 
or agency has the authority of oversight and enforcement based on the APPIHAO76. On the other hand, 
the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) has an investigative power concerning the 
enforcement of the APPIHAO by all other ministries, including the Minister of Justice for the Police as 
mentioned in the draft adequacy decision77.  
170. The Minister may request the head of an administrative organ to submit materials and explanations 
regarding the handling of personal information by the concerned administrative organ based on Article 
50 of the APPIHAO. It may request a revision of the measures when it is suspected that a violation or 
inappropriate operation of the Act has occurred as well as issuing opinions concerning the handling of 
personal information by the concerned Administrative Organ according to Articles 50 and 51 of the 
APPIHAO. 
171. The draft adequacy decision and the Annex II are also mentioning the establishment of 51 
comprehensive information centres which are “ensuring the smooth implementation of this Act” 
according to Article 47 of the APPIHAO. The EDPB notes that the APPIHAO does not explain further the 
role and powers of those information centres but the draft adequacy decision provides some 
precisions.  
172. Therefore, the EDPB welcomes the fact that there is an executive oversight on the respect of the 
APPIHAO on Ministries and administrative organs by the MIC.  
173. As a conclusion, EU laws and the ECHR, in the jurisprudence of their respective Courts, are establishing 
standards and guarantees according to which the oversight has to be complete, neutral and 
independent. The EDPB notes that the PPC does not have supervisory powers in matters related to law 
enforcement. Furthermore, if the oversight conducted by the Diet, the National and Prefectural Safety 
Commission appears to be neutral and independent, further clarification is needed about the 
supervisory powers of the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions.  
4.1.3 Redress in the field of criminal law 
174. The draft adequacy decision, complemented by Annex II, presents several avenues through which 
individuals can bring their complaints, both before independent authorities and before judges. 
175. These avenues and the core elements of these procedures stemming from the available 
documentation are presented here after, following a brief overview of the available rights to clarify 
what data subjects can expect from public authorities in the context of data processing in the field of 
criminal procedures. 
4.1.3.1 Available rights of data subjects in the context of criminal procedures 
176. In order to obtain redress, data subjects need to have rights under the law to be able to claim they 
were not respected. Therefore, the EDPB also assessed the available rights in the context of criminal 
procedures presented in the draft adequacy decision. 
 
                                                          
76 See Annex II p. 10. 
77 See Annex II p. 11. 
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4.1.3.1.1 General limitations to the rights of data subjects under the APPIHAO   
177. In its draft adequacy decision, the COM refers to and relies on general data protection principles which 
public authorities have to respect, once they have collected personal data. These principles are also 
further outlined in the Annex II so that the EDPB has decided to also comment on them.  
178. Concerning available rights, the EDPB notes that, according to Annex II of the draft Adequacy decision, 
some of the general rights provided to data subjects in the context of data processed by Administrative 
organs, remain available also in the context of criminal investigations. However, additional limitations 
with regard to the collection and further handling of personal information in this context also follow 
from the APPIHAO itself.  
179. These limitations, which also appear to apply both in the context of data collected on the basis of a 
warrant as well as on the basis of an enquiry sheet in the context of voluntary disclosure, raise 
questions concerning several aspects. 
180. Concerning the principle of purpose limitation, although in principle administrative organs are required 
to specify the purpose for which they retain personal data, and shall not retain them beyond the scope 
necessary for the achievement of the purpose of use specified, they can change the purpose if it is 
“what can reasonably be considered as appropriately relevant for the original purpose”. 
181. The APPIHAO also provides for the principle of non-disclosure, according to which an employee shall 
not disclose the acquired personal information to another person without a justifiable ground or use 
such information for an unjust purpose. However, no additional information is provided concerning 
the interpretation of what “justifiable ground” or “unjust purpose” could cover, so that further 
clarification would be necessary for the assessment.  
182. Article 8(1) of the APPIHAO also lays down the prohibition to use or disclose data “except as otherwise 
provided by laws and regulations”. Nevertheless, although this provision is not in principle contrary to 
the level of protection afforded under EU law, the EDPB lacks additional elements concerning the 
extent to which any supervision or checks is exercised when disclosure is provided by laws or 
regulations. In addition, under Article 8(2), additional exceptions apply to this rule where “such 
exceptional disclosure is not likely to cause unjust harm to the rights and interests of the data subject 
or a third party”. Without any further elements on this point, this exception, which relies on the unclear 
notion of “unjust” harm, needs further clarification, if it is narrow enough.  
183. Lastly, Article 9 of the APPIHAO provides for additional restrictions on the purpose or method of use 
or any other restrictions, to be imposed by the head of an administrative organ where retained 
personal information is provided to another person. As the notions of “any other necessary 
restrictions” and “provided to another person” are very broad, these additional restrictions to the 
rights of data subjects raise concerns without further clarifications on the scope of this provision. 
184. While the EDPB is fully aware that access rights and other data protection principles are also limited in 
criminal proceedings under EU law, additional safeguards are provided when such limitations are 
foreseen, including in terms of supervision, oversight and redress. In the absence of sufficient case law 
on these limitations or additional elements to clarify the scope of these provisions, the EDPB is not in 
a position to assess whether these limitations to the rights of data subjects are limited to what would 
be considered strictly necessary and proportionate under EU law, and would thus be essentially 




4.1.3.1.2 Additional limitations to the rights of the APPIHAO deriving from the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the Prefectural Police ordinances 
185. The EDPB notes that although the APPIHAO seems to be applicable to all processing by administrative 
organs in Japan, some important limitations to the rights of data subjects derive from specific 
legislations. In particular, Article 53 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure78 provides that “personal 
information recorded in documents relating to trials and seized articles” are excluded from the scope 
of application of the individual rights in Chapter IV of the APPIHAO. Concretely, the EDPB therefore 
understands that in the context of criminal procedures, data subjects do not benefit from the rights to 
information, access, rectification or erasure for personal data recorded in documents relating to trials 
and seized articles. 
186. With regards to these limitations, the EDPB understands that they apply in the context of data 
collected on the basis of warrants, as well as in the context of data collected under the voluntary 
disclosure through enquiry sheets (see below). Indeed, the legal basis of the two procedures to access 
data (through a warrant and through an enquiry sheet) being provided in the code of criminal 
procedure, Article 53-2 of this code appears to apply to both types of collection. However, as Article 
53-2 refers to the articles “seized” it could be clarified whether the limitations to the rights foreseen 
under this provision do apply also in the context of voluntary disclosure. 
187. The EDPB regrets not to be provided with the ordinances of the Prefectural Police, which are said to 
be protecting personal information, rights and obligations equivalent to the APPIHAO. Given both the 
unclarities regarding the interpretation of the APPIHAO and the unavailability of the Prefectural Police 
ordinances, the EDPB wonders, if the granted rights to the individuals in this context, and the additional  
oversight and/or redress mechanisms are sufficient to  compensate the absence of rights.  
4.1.3.2 Redress through independent authorities redress 
4.1.3.2.1 Administrative redress 
188. The EDPB notes that the administrative organs collecting data, such as the Prefectural Police, are 
competent to deal with requests stemming from individuals concerning their – limited – rights with 
regards to their data collected as part of criminal investigations (see above concerning the rights 
available), which appear to include both the collection of data based on a warrant and on enquiry 
sheets. Concretely, these rights seem to be limited to general principles, such as the necessity of data 
retention, in connection with the purpose (see Article 3.1 APPIHAO), the purpose limitation principle 
(Article 4) or the accuracy of the data (Article 5), while individual rights such as the right to information, 
access, rectification or erasure are excluded for personal data recorded in documents relating to trials 
and seized articles79. Although these organs cannot be considered as independent and therefore as 
providing independent redress or oversight, the EDPB welcomes this avenue. However, it stresses that 
complaints filed in this context remain limited to very few rights of the data subjects given the 
limitations of rights provided by the APPIHAO. 
189. Furthermore, as “personal information recorded in documents relating to trials and seized articles” are 
excluded from the scope of application of the individual rights in Chapter IV of the APPIHAO pursuant 
to Articles 53-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the possibilities to request access to personal 
information are also limited to the procedures foreseen under other provisions of this Code of Criminal 
Procedure. It seems that only victims, suspected or accused persons can act in this context, and still, 
                                                          
78 Available here http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&id=2283&re=02&vm=02 and 
quoted in Annex II of the draft adequacy decision, footnote 25. 
79 See supra concerning the limitations to APPIHAO and in particular see article 53-2 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (not provided but quoted in annex II of the draft adequacy decision, footnote 25). 
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depending on the stage of the criminal procedure. Therefore, the EDPB is concerned that no general 
right to access and/or rectify or delete information is available to data subjects under Japanese law in 
the context of criminal procedure, and that all redress avenues available imply to be either a victim (in 
which case the person would probably know that his/her data were collected) or a suspect or accused 
person, or the demonstration of a damage, while data subjects should also have the right to have 
access to their data and possibly to have their data rectified or deleted when they did not suffer any 
damage (yet possibly) and/or when they are neither a victim, a suspect or an accused person, but 
witnesses for instance. 
4.1.3.2.2 Administrative redress through the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions 
190. In addition, the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions appear to be competent to deal with 
complaints. Based on Article 79 of the Police law referred to in the draft adequacy decision, individuals 
can complaint against any illegal or improper behaviour of an agent in the execution of his/her duties.  
191. The EDPB seeks clarification whether any “illegal” processing of personal data qualifies for an “illegal 
or improper behaviour of an agent” and on the demonstration of a disadvantage which seems required 
from the data subject. Indeed, the notice issued by the NPA to the Police and Prefectural Public Safety 
Commissions on the proper handling of complaints regarding the execution of duties by police officers 
limit the complaints to concrete claims concerning “correction for any specific disadvantage that has 
been inflicted as the result of an illegal or inappropriate behaviour, or failure to take a necessary action, 
by a police officer in his/her execution of duty” and the possibility to “file grievance/discontent about 
inappropriate mode of duty execution by a police officer”.  It is expressly clarified that “complaints on 
non-performance of a police officer concerning any matter that is not considered to fall under a police 
officer's duty, and also those expressing a general opinion or a proposal, not directly affecting the 
complaining party itself, shall be excluded”. 
192. Concerning the procedural requirements to file a complaint, although they have to be filed in writing, 
the EDPB notes that assistance for writing the complaint is provided in this context under Japanese 
law, including for foreigners. In addition, the Japanese government seems to have also entrusted the 
PPC with the duty to provide assistance to EU data subjects to handle and resolve complaints in this 
field, which the EDPB welcomes. The EDPB underlines that in its understanding, in this context, the 
PPC will only act as a point of contact between the EU data subjects and the competent authorities in 
Japan.  
193. The results of the Prefectural Public Safety Commission following a complaint shall not be noticed in 
cases listed in Article 79-2 of the Police Act, which includes the case where the current “resident of the 
complainant is unknown”. The EDPB acknowledges that the reference to the resident does not imply 
that in all cases EU data subjects would therefore be excluded from the notification of the results of 
their complaints on the ground they are not residing in Japan. 
4.1.3.2.3 Ad Hoc mechanism implying the PPC 
194. In view of the findings described above, The EDPB welcomes that the Japanese government and the 
EU Commission have agreed on an additional redress mechanism providing EU individuals with an 
additional avenue for redress in Japan through which individuals can also seek redress against unlawful 
or improper investigations by public authorities. The EDPB also notes and welcomes that the requests 
can be lodged with the PPC, rather than with another government official, thereby extending the scope 
of competence of the PPC to the area of law enforcement and national security.   
195. The focus of the EDPB, when analysing the new mechanism, has been to understand the powers the 
PPC has in this context.  
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196. Even though the language is not entirely clear, the EDPB understands that the additional redress 
mechanism does not require “standing” in the meaning that the requestor is not required to show that 
her personal data is likely to have been subjected to surveillance by a Japanese authority. The EDPB 
would still like to request confirmation by the Commission.   
197. In line with its assessment of the Ombudsperson mechanism, created under the Privacy Shield, the 
EDPB stresses the need for effective powers of the addressee of the request, in this case the PPC, in 
order to consider the redress mechanism as essentially equivalent to an effective remedy in the 
meaning of Art. 47 of the Charta on Fundamental Rights.  
198. When explaining the redress mechanism, the Japanese government refers to Art. 6, 61 (ii) and 80 APPI 
and lays out these powers in Annex II. It is the understanding of the EDPB that the procedure as 
described in Annex II specifies or extends the powers of the PPC, as the language in Art. 6, 61 (ii) and 
80 APPI is rather vague and general. To the extent Annex II specifies or extends the powers of the PPC, 
the EDPB would like to ask for clarification that the other agencies of the Japanese government are 
bound by them.  
199. On the basis of the procedure in Annex II, the EDPB notes that the competent public authorities in 
Japan are required to cooperate with the PPC, “including by providing them with the necessary 
information and relevant material, so that the PPC can evaluate whether the collection or the 
subsequent use of personal information has taken place in compliance with the applicable rules”. For 
the assessment of the effectiveness of the system, it is thus important to refer again to the powers 
that those competent authorities have with which the PPC cooperates. It is the understanding of the 
EDPB that those powers would not be extended through the reassurances in Annex II.  
200. The EDPB also notes that, if a violation of the rules has been identified, “the cooperation by the 
concerned public authorities with the PPC includes the obligation to remedy the violation”, which 
expressly includes the deletion of the data collected in violation of the applicable rules. The EDPB 
understands that the obligations of the competent authority stem from the “cooperation with the 
PPC”, rather than from a decision by the PPC.    
201. Finally, the PPC will inform the requestor of the “outcome of the evaluation, including any corrective 
action taken where applicable.” In addition, the PPC will inform the requestor about the “possibility of 
seeking a confirmation of the outcome from the competent public authority and about the authority 
to which such a request for confirmation shall be made.” 
202. In addition, the PPC has committed to assist the requestor with bringing further action under Japanese 
law, if the requestor is dissatisfied with the outcome of the procedure. 
203. In light of the need to have an effective redress mechanism essentially equivalent to the EU standards, 
the EDPB nevertheless wonders if the PPC has any specific powers other than evaluating whether the 
collection or the subsequent use of personal information has taken place in compliance with the 
applicable rules and calling on the competent authorities to use their respective powers and to deal 
with complaints forwarded to them by the PPC.  Should the PPC only act as a contact point for the EU 
individuals, the EDPB would consider this as insufficient to provide for an effective redress mechanism 
essentially equivalent to the EU standards. The EDPB thus calls on the Commission to provide 
clarifications on the points mentioned in this sub-chapter, in particular on whether and how the 
mechanism extends the obligations of competent authorities, how they are bound by it, and how the 





4.1.3.3 Judicial redress 
4.1.3.3.1 Quasi complaint mechanism 
204. The so-called “quasi-complaint” procedure allows to act against compulsory collection of information 
based on a warrant to have an illegal seizure rescinded or altered.  
205. This avenue implies the individual is aware of the data being seized. However, the EDPB understands 
that the procedure for the collection of data based on a warrant is not notified to the data subject. 
Equally, it understands that voluntary disclosure does not imply that companies requested have the 
obligation to inform the data subjects of requests received and complied with. Therefore, although it 
is stressed in the Annex II that “such a challenge can be brought without the individual having to wait 
for the conclusion of the case”, in practice, apart for warrants authorising wiretapping, for which it is 
indicated that the Law provides for a notification requirement80, this avenue seems to be effectively 
available only once the data subject got aware of the collection through a case brought against her or 
him.  
4.1.3.3.2 Injunctive relief 
206. In addition, in order to obtain the deletion of data collected through a criminal procedure (the so-
called “injunctive relief”), or to obtain compensation of damages, individuals can also bring civil actions 
before a judge. 
207. As regards compensation, the EDPB notes that the procedure seems to be circumscribed to situations 
where a public officer in the course of his duties, unlawfully and with fault (intentionally or negligently) 
inflicted damage on the individual concerned. In the understanding of the EDPB, the damage appears 
to include moral damages. It is however not set out in further detail what needs to be demonstrated 
by the individual that he/she suffered a damage. The EDPB was not in a position to assess the case law 
concerning the award of compensation, and is therefore unable to assess whether this avenue 
provides for an effective remedy in case of damage. 
208. With regards to the “injunctive relief”, the EDPB also notes that to file a request, the individual should 
first be aware that his/her data were collected and that they are still retained. Therefore, given the 
limited rights of information and access of individuals in the context of criminal investigations and 
procedures, the efficiency of the procedure appears to be rather limited too. 
4.1.3.4 Overall assessment of the avenues for redress 
209. Following the assessment of all the redress avenues open for individuals under Japanese law as well 
as to the EU data subjects before the PPC, the EDPB welcomes the ad hoc dispute resolution 
mechanism, involving the PPC. It has an added value for EU data subjects, in particular since it allows 
them to understand which avenues are available for them to obtain redress and/or compensation, as 
well as to present their requests according to the applicable procedural requirements under Japanese 
law. However, further clarifications are necessary, in particular on whether and how the mechanism 
extends the obligations of competent authorities, how they are bound by it, and how the PPC can 
effectively ensure compliance, in order to ensure that this new mechanism provides for effective 
redress. 
210. This assessment shows that no redress mechanism in Japanese law appears to allow for access, 
rectification or deletion of data for data subjects who are not victims, suspects or accused in the 
context of a criminal procedure, for instance to remedy unlawful collection or retention of their data. 
                                                          
80 Article 23 of the Wiretapping Act is mentioned page 33 of the draft adequacy decision, however the EDPB 
was not provided with this text and is therefore unable to assess to which extent this notification obligation 
applies and in which cases it might be limited.  
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It also shows that all redress and compensation mechanisms and procedures available under Japanese 
law for victims, suspects or accused person imply the knowledge of the collection of data, which 
appears to be limited in practice since limited rights of access and information are provided for them. 
In addition, further clarification appears necessary about the demonstration of an illegal behaviour on 
the part of the authorities, in particular whether such behaviour includes any illegal processing of 
personal data, or of a damage suffered by the individual.  
211. Therefore, without further documentation and elements, the EDPB is concerned as to whether redress 
under Japanese law and under the draft adequacy decision is sufficiently effective compared to the 
standards in EU law.  
4.2 Access for national security purposes 
4.2.1 Scope of surveillance 
212. In the draft adequacy decision, the chapter on “access and use by Japanese public authorities for 
national security purposes” is introduced by a general statement, in line with the reassurance provided 
by the Japanese government in Annex II, according to which no Japanese law would provide and thus 
permit “compulsory requests for information or "administrative wiretapping" outside criminal 
investigations”. As a conclusion, it is said that “on national security grounds information may only be 
obtained from an information source that can be freely accessed by anyone or by voluntary disclosure. 
This excludes any covert surveillance activities in this area. Business operators receiving a request for 
voluntary cooperation (in the form of disclosure of electronic information) are under no legal 
obligation to provide such information.”81 
213. Within these limitations, four government entities are listed which have the power to collect electronic 
information held by Japanese business operators on national security grounds. With regard to the 
Ministry of Defence, as one of those four entities, it is said that it “only has authority to collect 
(electronic) information through voluntary disclosures”.82  
214. For its assessment of the general setup of data collection for the purpose of national security, the EDPB 
wishes to recall the first of the four so called “essential guarantees”, according to which “processing 
should be based on clear, precise and accessible rules”.83 More specifically, the ECHR has been very 
clear that surveillance programs are only “in accordance with the law” if the surveillance measures 
“have some basis in domestic law”. The court has clarified that compatibility with the rule of law 
requires the law authorizing the measure must be accessible and foreseeable as to its effects. Referring 
to the risk of arbitrariness, the court has required “clear, detailed rules on secret surveillance 
measures”; “sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which 
and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measure”.84  
215. For the application of these essential guarantees to the legal system of Japan, the EDPB is aware not 
only of the fact that, in matters of national security, states have a broad margin of appreciation, 
recognized by the European Court of Human Rights. Also, national security powers reflect the historical 
experiences nations make. The EDPB thus understands that, as emphasized by the Japanese 
                                                          
81 Adequacy decision, paragraph 151. 
82 Adequacy decision, paragraph 153. 
83 WP29, WP 237: Working Document 01/2016 on the justification of interferences with the fundamental rights 
to privacy and data protection through surveillance measures when transferring personal data (European 
Essential Guarantees). 
84 See e.g. Big Brother Watch and others v. the United Kingdom, paragraph 305.   
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government, after World War II, Japanese national intelligence agencies have been equipped with 
more limited powers than in other states.       
216. In the reading of the EDPB, the draft adequacy decision, in line with the reassurance by the Japanese 
government, suggests that Japanese government entities do not run programs, which strategically 
monitor or broadly surveille (internet) communication. As said above, the Japanese government has 
given reassurance, in a letter signed by the Minister of Justice, that “on national security grounds 
information may only be obtained from an information source that can be freely accessed by anyone 
or by voluntary disclosure”.  
217. As to the legal basis of the Ministry of Defence, the EDPB notes that the draft adequacy decision 
includes general information about its powers and quotes its mission “to conduct such affairs as 
related thereto in order to secure national peace and independence, and the safety of the nation”. 
However, the EDPB has not been provided with an English translation of the legal basis.  
218. At the same time, the EDPB is aware of reports published in different media suggesting that 
surveillance programs are run by the Directorate for Signals Intelligence of Japan’s Ministry of Defense 
(MOD).85 In the report, it is also claimed that the Japanese Ministry of Defense, while refusing to 
discuss specifics of the report, has “acknowledged that Japan has “offices throughout the country” that 
are intercepting communications” and that those “would be focused on military activities and 
“cyberthreats” and are “not collecting the general public’s information”. The latter statement (that the 
MOD does not collect information on the general public) is made part of the restatement by the 
Japanese government. 
219. It stands that the Japanese government has restated, in a letter signed by the Minister of Justice, that 
the MOD does not collect information on the general public.  
220. It is beyond the task of the EDPB to make a general assessment of the possible surveillance capabilities 
of the Japanese government. Those activities are only important for its assessment if they are relevant 
for the transfer of personal data between the EU and Japan. In this context, the EDPB would like to 
reaffirm its approach already adopted by its predecessor when asked to opine on the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield. When giving an opinion on the Privacy Shield, the WP29 included in its analysis the powers and 
limits of the U.S. to conduct surveillance of data “on its way” to the U.S.86 Applying the same standard 
for the adequacy decision on Japan, the EDPB takes the view that information on the powers of 
Japanese authorities to surveille data “on its way” to Japan are relevant. Should these surveillance 
powers exist, also the decision in Big Brother Watch by the ECHR appears to suggest that such powers 
would have to be regulated in accordance with the standards established by the ECHR.  
221. As a consequence, if interceptions were limited to the “assistance of military action”, they may well 
not be relevant for the assessment of the adequacy decision. It is thus the interest of the EDPB to 
receive clarifications on the surveillance measures by Japanese governmental entities. In this respect, 
such clarification would be welcome in order to determine whether data undergoing transfer under 
                                                          
85 In May 2018, the online news publication “The Intercept” published a report titled “The untold story of 
Japan’s secret spy agency”. 
86 See WP255, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield –First annual joint review, adopted on 28 November 2017, p. 16: “WP29 is 
of the view that the analysis of the laws of the third-country for which adequacy is considered, should not be 
limited to the law and practice allowing for surveillance within that country’s physical borders, but should also 
include an analysis of the legal grounds in that third-country’s law which enable it to conduct surveillance 
outside its territory as far as EU data are concerned. As already underlined in its previous opinion, “it should be 
clear that the Privacy Shield Principles will apply from the moment the data transfer takes place, which means 
including as regards data “on its way” to that country.”  
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this adequacy framework could be the subject of access for national security purposes by the Japanese 
competent authorities in that field. 
4.2.2 Voluntary disclosure in case of national security 
222. The draft adequacy decision states that the four government entities only have the authority to collect 
(electronic) information by voluntary disclosure. According to the draft decision and Annex II, there 
are some limitations on statutory grounds, which means that the collection of data is limited to what 
is necessary for the execution of the tasks by the entities. 
223. In the area of criminal law, as mentioned in the section about law enforcement, voluntary disclosure 
is only permissible as part of a criminal investigation, and thus presupposes a concrete suspicion of a 
crime that is already committed. Investigations in the area of national security differ from 
investigations in the area of law enforcement. The EDPB acknowledges that, according to Annex II, the 
central principles of “necessity for investigation” and “appropriateness of method” similarly apply in 
the area of national security and have to be complied with taking appropriate account of the specific 
circumstances of each case.87 It regrets that the application is not further clarified, including by way of 
further reference to case law. Nevertheless the EDPB states, that the use of this procedure has to be 
proportionate or necessary. 
224. According to the draft decision, when personal information has been collected (‘obtained’), its 
handling is governed by the APPIHAO except for the Prefectural Police.88  Annex II states that the 
handling of personal information by the Prefectural Police is governed by prefectural ordinances that 
stipulate principles for the protection of personal information, rights and obligations equivalent to the 
APPIHAO.89 Because there are no English translations available for these ordinances, the EDPB is not 
in a position to assess whether the principles are equivalent to those of the APPIHAO. 
225. For the other remarks on voluntary disclosure, reference is made to the section on law enforcement.  
4.2.3 Oversight 
4.2.3.1 General Points 
226. The four government entities empowered to collect electronic information held by Japanese business 
operators on national security grounds, are: (i) the Cabinet Intelligence & Research Office (CIRO); (ii) 
the Ministry of Defence ("MOD"); (iii) the police (both National Police Agency (NPA)90 and Prefectural 
Police); and (iv) the Public Security Intelligence Agency ("PSIA"). 
227. According to the draft adequacy decision, these government entities are subject to several layers of 
oversight from three branches of the government91. The EDPB notes that there are oversight 
mechanism within the legislative branch (Japanese Diet) and the executive branch (Inspector General’s 
Office of Legal Compliance (IGO), the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions and the Public Security 
Examination Commission). The EDPB stresses that the COM should clarify the judicial oversight (ex-
officio/guarantee C of the WP 237; for redress, there is a separate chapter in the draft decision and an 
extra guarantee in the WP 237) of the above-mentioned government bodies, as it is unclear whether 
                                                          
87 See Annex II, pp. 23. 
88 Adequacy decision, paragraph 118 and 157. 
89 See Annex II, pp. 3.  
90 However, according to the information received, the main role of the NPA is to coordinate investigations 
by the various Prefectural Police departments and its information collection activities are limited to 
exchanges with foreign authorities.  
91 See Annex II, pp. 39. 
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there is such a judicial oversight in the area of collection of personal information for national security 
purposes without compulsory means. 
4.2.3.2 Oversight by the Japanese Diet 
228. The EDPB notes that the Japanese Diet may conduct investigations in relation to the activities of public 
authorities, therefore also for all of the aforementioned government entities. Furthermore, the diet 
may also request the production of documents and the testimony of witnesses (Article 62 of the 
Japanese Constitution, Article 104 Diet Law). The EDPB also remarks that according to Articles 74 and 
75 Diet Law, Diet members may ask written questions to the Cabinet which may end in an answer from 
the Cabinet (Article 75 Diet Law). Finally, it is as well noted that there are specific reporting obligations 
for e.g. the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) (Article 36 SAPA/Art 31 ACO), by means of a 
yearly report to the Diet. Such a report was not provided to the EDPB. 
4.2.3.3 Oversight by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (IGO) 
229. The EDPB notes that there is an oversight body for the MOD, called IGO. The EDPB was not provided 
with the MOD Establishment Act (Act for the Establishment of the MOD), but only with the 
representations in Annex II to the draft decision. Pursuant to Annex II, the IGO is an independent office 
within the MOD, which is under the direct supervision of the Minister of Defense according to Article 
29 of the MOD Establishment Act. The IGO has the powers of carrying out inspections of compliance 
with laws and regulations by officials of the MOD (« so called « Defense Inspections »), across the 
entire ministry including the Self-Defense Forces.  
230. Pursuant to the Annex II, the IGO performs its duties independently from MOD’s operational 
departments. The EDPB notes that the IGO is an internal oversight body.  
231. Inspections lead to findings and, with the intention to ensure compliance, measures which are directly 
reported to the Minister of Defence. Based on the report of the IGO, the Minister of Defence may issue 
orders to implement the measures necessary to remedy the situation. The Deputy Vice minister of 
Defence is responsible for implementing these measures and must report to the Minister of Defence 
on the status of such an implementation. 
232. Analysing Annex II, without being provided with the legal provisions (MOD Establishment Act) for this 
considerations, the EDPB welcomes the possibility of ordering necessary compliance measures to 
remedy the situation. However, the EDPB raises doubts regarding the independence of the IGO, as it 
is an office within the MOD and is under direct supervision of the Minister of Defence pursuant to 
Annex II (according to the WP 237 « functional independence is not by itself sufficient to protect that 
supervisory authority from all external influence»).  
233. In alignment to the case law of the ECHR and the WP 237 respectively following the considerations of 
Annex II, the Inspector General can request for reports from the concerned office (documents, sites, 
explanations). Clarification as to whether the offices concerned are obliged to follow these requests 
or not and whether the requested documents include closed materials, like the WP 237 mentions or 
not, appear necessary to the EDPB.  
234. Although the EDPB welcomes that very senior legal experts (former Superintending Prosecutor) head 
the IGO, clarification about the manner of appointment of this supervisory body appears necessary. 
4.2.3.4 Oversight by Public Security Examination Commission 
235. According to Annex II (page 25), PSIA carries out regular and special inspections on the operations of 
its individual bureaus and offices (Public Security Intelligence Bureau, Public Security Intelligence 
Offices and Sub Offices, etc). For the purposes of the regular inspection, an Assistant Director General 
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and/or a Director are designated as inspectors. Such inspections should also concern the management 
of personal information.  
236. Pursuant to recital 163 of the draft decision the Public Security Examination Commission operates as 
an independent ex ante oversight body for the PSIA, with regards to issues of the ACO92 and SAPA93. 
The EDPB welcomes that.  
237. Although the website of the Japanese Ministry of Justice provides some information94, the EDPB is not 
in the position to carefully further assess the independency of the Public Security Examination 
Commission since it was not provided with the Act of the establishment of the Public Security 
Examination Commission95 and the Rules of the Public Security Examination Commission96.  
4.2.3.5 Oversight by National Public Safety Commission, Prefectural Public Safety Commissions 
and the APPIHAO (executive) 
238. See 3.1.2.2.1 (National Public Safety Commission), 3.1.2.2.2. (Prefectural Public Safety Commissions) 
and 3.1.2.2.4. (Executive).   
4.2.3.6 Oversight by PPC 
239. The EDPB invites the COM to either mention in Recital 164 that the PPC is not an oversight body for 
the aforementioned government entities and that it is only competent for the redress of the individuals 
or to move the passage in recital 164 about the PPC to the section « individual redress ».  
4.2.4 Redress mechanism 
240. For the analysis of the newly negotiated redress mechanism, reference is made to the section on law 
enforcement. 
241. In addition, it is noteworthy that the Japanese law provides for a specific individual redress avenue 
available in the area of national security. It is the understanding of the EDPB that all individuals, 
including EU individuals, may generally request disclosure, correction (including deletion) or 
suspension of use from the administrative organs, also if those are processed for national security 
purposes. In case such a request is “rejected on the grounds that the concerned information is 
considered non-disclosable”, an appeal for review may be lodged, and the “Information Disclosure and 
Personal Information Protection Review Board“ has to be consulted. The Board is composed of 
members appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of both Houses, equipped with 
investigative powers, and concludes with a written report for the concerned individual, which is not 
                                                          
92 Act on the Control of Organizations Which Have Committed Acts of 
Indiscriminate Mass Murder (Act No. 147 of December 7, 1999). 
93 Subversive Activities Prevention Act(Act No. 240 of July 21, 1952). 
94 See http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/MEOM/meom-01.html (September 2018): the extra-ministerial organ ”is 
composed of a chairperson and six members. They are selected from among persons of good character who are 
capable of making a fair judgment on the control of organizations and those who have ample knowledge and 
experience of both law and society. They are appointed by the Prime Minister and must be approved by both 
houses of the Diet. With regard to the application of the previously mentioned laws (SAPA/ACO), the members 
perform their duties quite independently, free from any direction or supervision of the Prime Minister or the 
Minister of Justice.” 
95 http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=&vm=2&id=613 (September 2018). 
96 Article 28 ACO. 
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legally binding, but almost always followed.97 According to Annex II, there were only two out of 2000 
cases, where an administrative authority took a decision that differed from the Board’s conclusion.98  
242. It appears to follow from the explanation provided that the review is not available, if the information 
can be “disclosed” but the individual is dissatisfied with the outcome. The EDPB acknowledges this 
avenue for redress, but would like to seek further clarification on the latter aspect, which would 








                                                          
97 Annex II, p. 25, 26. Act for Establishment of the Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection 
Review Board, Art. 4, 9, 11. 
98 Annex II, footnote 35. 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
 
Editor’s Note 
The amendment ratified by 1971 Act No 276 (1971 (57) 315) revised and rewrote this article, substituting 
present Section Section 1 to 23 for former Section Section 1 to 29. The amendment also transferred and 
renumbered the following sections of the former article: former Section 3 was transferred and renumbered 
as Section 1A of Article III; former Section 6 was transferred and renumbered as Section 3A of Article X; 
former Section 7 was transferred and renumbered as Section 3B of Article X; former Section 11 was 
transferred and renumbered as Section 1B of Article XVII; former Section 28 was transferred and 
renumbered as Section 4 of Article XIV. The provisions of former Section 9 of this article now appear in 
Section 1 of Article II, as amended by amendment ratified by 1971 Act No 277 (1971 (57) 319). 
 
SECTION 1. Political power in people. 
 All political power is vested in and derived from the people only, therefore, they have the right at all 
times to modify their form of government. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 1 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see former Art I, Section 1. 
 
SECTION 2. Religious freedom; freedom of speech; right of assembly and petition. 
 The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble and to petition the government or any department thereof for a redress of grievances. (1970 (56) 
2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 4 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section Section 6, 7, 
9, 10. 
 
SECTION 3. Privileges and immunities; due process; equal protection of laws. 
 The privileges and immunities of citizens of this State and of the United States under this Constitution 
shall not be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 5 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 12. 
 
SECTION 4. Attainder; ex post facto laws; impairment of contracts; titles; effect of conviction. 
 No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, law impairing the obligation of contracts, nor law granting any 
title of nobility or hereditary emolument, shall be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood 
or forfeiture of estate. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 8 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art 1, Section Section 4, 21. 
 
SECTION 5. Elections, free and open. 
 All elections shall be free and open, and every inhabitant of this State possessing the qualifications 
provided for in this Constitution shall have an equal right to elect officers and be elected to fill public office. 
(1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 10 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 31. 
 
SECTION 6. Residence. 




The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 12 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 35. 
 
SECTION 7. Suspension of laws. 
 The power to suspend the laws shall be exercised only by the General Assembly or by its authority in 
particular cases expressly provided for by it. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section 13 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 24. 
 
SECTION 8. Separation of powers. 
 In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall 
be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one 
of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 14 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 26. 
 
SECTION 9. Courts; speedy remedy. 
 All courts shall be public, and every person shall have speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained. (1970 
(56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 15 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 15. 
 
SECTION 10. Searches and seizures; invasions of privacy. 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 




The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section 16 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 22. 
 
SECTION 11. Presentment or indictment. 
 No person may be held to answer for any crime the jurisdiction over which is not within the magistrate’s 
court, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury of the county where the crime has been 
committed, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time 
of war or public danger. The General Assembly may provide for the waiver of an indictment by the accused. 
Nothing contained in this Constitution is deemed to limit or prohibit the establishment by the General 
Assembly of a state grand jury with the authority to return indictments irrespective of the county where the 
crime has been committed and that other authority, including procedure, as the General Assembly may 
provide. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315; 1989 Act No. 5; 1989 Act No. 8.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section 17 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art 1, Section Section 18, 
23. 
 
SECTION 12. Double jeopardy; self-incrimination. 
 No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall 




The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section 17 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art 1, Section Section 18, 
23. 
 
SECTION 13. Taking private property; economic development; remedy of blight. 
 (A) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for private use 
without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made for the 
property. Private property must not be condemned by eminent domain for any purpose or benefit including, 
but not limited to, the purpose or benefit of economic development, unless the condemnation is for public 
use. 
 (B) For the limited purpose of the remedy of blight, the General Assembly may provide by law that 
private property constituting a danger to the safety and health of the community by reason of lack of 
ventilation, light, and sanitary facilities, dilapidation, deleterious land use, or any combination of these 
factors may be condemned by eminent domain without the consent of the owner and put to a public use or 




The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section 17 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section Section 18, 
23. 
 
SECTION 14. Trial by jury; witnesses; defense. 
 The right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate. Any person charged with an offense shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself or by his counsel or by both. (1970 
(56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section Section 18 and 25 of Article I as it 
existed prior to the 1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, 
Section Section 11, 13. 
 
SECTION 15. Right of bail; excessive bail; cruel or unusual or corporal punishment; detention of 
witnesses. 
 All persons shall be, before conviction, bailable by sufficient sureties, but bail may be denied to persons 
charged with capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprisonment, or with violent offenses defined 
by the General Assembly, giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the 
event. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor 
corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained. (1970 (56) 
2684; 1971 (57) 315; 1998 Act No. 259.) 
 
SECTION 16. Libel. 
 In all indictments or prosecutions for libel, the truth of the alleged libel may be given in evidence, and 
the jury shall be the judges of the law and facts. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 21 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 8. 
 
SECTION 17. Treason. 
 Treason against the State shall consist alone in levying war or in giving aid and comfort to enemies 
against the State. No person shall be held guilty of treason, except upon testimony of at least two witnesses 
to the same overt act, or upon confession in open court. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315; 2007 Act No. 15.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of the first paragraph of this section are identical to former Section 22 of Article I 
as it existed prior to the 1971 revision. It would seem that the intention of the 1973 amendments relating to 
slum clearance (1970 (57) 1340; 1973 (58) 123) was to add the provisos of the second and third paragraphs 
of this section to Section 17 of this article as it existed prior to the 1971 revision. Similar paragraphs were 
transferred to Section 5 of Article XIV by the 1971 amendment which revised this article. 
 
SECTION 18. Suspension of habeas corpus. 
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in case of insurrection, 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 23 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 17. 
 
SECTION 19. Imprisonment for debt. 
 No person shall be imprisoned for debt except in cases of fraud. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 24 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 20. 
 
SECTION 20. Right to keep and bear arms; armies; military power subordinate to civil authority; how 
soldiers quartered. 
 A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed. As, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be 
maintained without the consent of the General Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be 
held in subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall in time of peace be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by 
law. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 26 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section Section 28, 
29. 
 
SECTION 21. Martial law. 
 No person shall in any case be subject to martial law or to any pains or penalties by virtue of that law, 
except those employed in the armed forces of the United States, and except the militia in actual service, but 
by the authority of the General Assembly. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are similar to former Section 27 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. For similar provisions in Constitution of 1868, see Const 1868, Art I, Section 25. 
 
SECTION 22. Procedure before administrative agencies; judicial review. 
 No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency 
affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard; nor shall he be subject to the 
same person for both prosecution and adjudication; nor shall he be deprived of liberty or property unless 
by a mode of procedure prescribed by the General Assembly, and he shall have in all such instances the 
right to judicial review. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
SECTION 23. Provisions of Constitution mandatory. 
 The provisions of the Constitution shall be taken, deemed, and construed to be mandatory and 
prohibitory, and not merely directory, except where expressly made directory or permissory by its own 
terms. (1970 (56) 2684; 1971 (57) 315.) 
 
Editor’s Note 
The present provisions of this section are identical to former Section 29 of Article I as it existed prior to the 
1971 revision. 
 
SECTION 24. Victims’ Bill of Rights. 
 (A) To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process regardless of race, sex, age, religion, 
or economic status, victims of crime have the right to: 
  (1) be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, 
throughout the criminal and juvenile justice process, and informed of the victim’s constitutional rights, 
provided by statute; 
  (2) be reasonably informed when the accused or convicted person is arrested, released from custody, 
or has escaped; 
  (3) be informed of and present at any criminal proceedings which are dispositive of the charges where 
the defendant has the right to be present; 
  (4) be reasonably informed of and be allowed to submit either a written or oral statement at all hearings 
affecting bond or bail; 
  (5) be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a plea, or sentencing; 
  (6) be reasonably protected from the accused or persons acting on his behalf throughout the criminal 
justice process; 
  (7) confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, before the trial or 
before any disposition and informed of the disposition; 
  (8) have reasonable access after the conclusion of the criminal investigation to all documents relating 
to the crime against the victim before trial; 
  (9) receive prompt and full restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct 
that caused the victim’s loss or injury, including both adult and juvenile offenders; 
  (10) be informed of any proceeding when any post-conviction action is being considered, and be 
present at any post-conviction hearing involving a post-conviction release decision; 
  (11) a reasonable disposition and prompt and final conclusion of the case; 
  (12) have all rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of evidence in all criminal 
proceedings protect victims’ rights and have these rules subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature 
to ensure protection of these rights. 
 (B) Nothing in this section creates a civil cause of action on behalf of any person against any public 
employee, public agency, the State, or any agency responsible for the enforcement of rights and provision 
of services contained in this section. The rights created in this section may be subject to a writ of mandamus, 
to be issued by any justice of the Supreme Court or circuit court judge to require compliance by any public 
employee, public agency, the State, or any agency responsible for the enforcement of the rights and 
provisions of these services contained in this section, and a wilful failure to comply with a writ of mandamus 
is punishable as contempt. 
 (C) For purposes of this section: 
  (1) A victim’s exercise of any right granted by this section is not grounds for dismissing any criminal 
proceeding or setting aside any conviction or sentence. 
  (2) “Victim” means a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial 
harm as the result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime against him. The term “victim” 
also includes the person’s spouse, parent, child, or lawful representative of a crime victim who is deceased, 
who is a minor or who is incompetent or who was a homicide victim or who is physically or psychologically 
incapacitated. 
  (3) The General Assembly has the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, 
implement, preserve, and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this section, including the authority to 
extend any of these rights to juvenile proceedings. 
  (4) The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights for victims shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others granted by the General Assembly or retained by victims. (1998 Act No. 259.) 
 
SECTION 25. Hunting and fishing. 
 The traditions of hunting and fishing are valuable parts of the state’s heritage, important for conservation, 
and a protected means of managing nonthreatened wildlife. The citizens of this State have the right to hunt, 
fish, and harvest wildlife traditionally pursued, subject to laws and regulations promoting sound wildlife 
conservation and management as prescribed by the General Assembly. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to abrogate any private property rights, existing state laws or regulations, or the state’s 
sovereignty over its natural resources. 
 
HISTORY: 2011 Act No. 20, Section 1, eff May 5, 2011. 
 
Editor’s Note 
2011 Act No. 20, Section 1, provides in part: 
“SECTION 1. The amendment to Article I of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895, prepared under the 
terms of Joint Resolution 3483 of 2009, having been submitted to the qualified electors at the General 
Election of 2010 as prescribed in Section 1, Article XVI of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895, and a 
favorable vote having been received on the amendment, is ratified and declared to be a part of the 
constitution so that Article I is amended by adding Section 25:” 
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The Working Party of EU Data Protection Authorities
1
 (the WP29) has previously published a Working 
Document on transfers of personal data to third countries (WP12)
2
.  With the replacement of the 
Directive by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
3
, WP29 is revisiting WP12, its earlier 





This working document seeks to update Chapter One of WP12 relating to the central question of 
adequate level of data protection in a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within 
that third country or in an international organization (hereafter: "third countries or international 
organizations"). This document will be continuously reviewed and if necessary updated in the coming 
years, based on the practical experience gained through the application of the GDPR.  Chapters 2 
(Applying the approach to countries that have ratified Convention 108) and 3 (Applying the approach 
to industry self-regulation) of the WP12 document should be updated at a later stage. 
 
This working paper is focused solely on adequacy decisions, which are implementing acts
5
 of the 
European Commission, according to article 45 of the GDPR. Other aspects of transfers of personal 
data to third countries and international organizations will be examined in following working papers 
that will be published separately (BCRs, derogations). 
 
This document aims to provide guidance to the European Commission and the WP29 under the 
GDPR for the assessment of the level of data protection in third countries and international 
organizations by establishing the core data protection principles that have to be present in a third 
country legal framework or an international organization in order to ensure essential equivalence with 
the EU framework. In addition, it may guide third countries and international organizations interested in 
obtaining adequacy. However, the principles set out in this working document are not addressed 
directly to data controllers or data processors.   
 
The present document consists of 4 Chapters:  
 
Chapter 1: Some broad information in relation to the concept on adequacy  
 
Chapter 2: Procedural aspects for adequacy findings under the GDPR  
 
Chapter 3: General Data Protection Principles. This chapter includes the core general data protection 
principles to ensure that the level of data protection in a third country or international organization is 
essentially equivalent to the one established by the EU legislation. 
 
Chapter 4: Essential guarantees for law enforcement and national security access to limit the 
interferences to fundamental rights. This Chapter includes the essential guarantees for law 
enforcement and national security access following the CJEU Schrems judgment in 2015 and based 
on the Essential Guarantees WP29 working document adopted in 2016.  
 
  
                                                          
1
As established under Article 29 of the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC  
2 WP12 , ‘Working Document: Transfers of personal data to third countries : Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the 
EU data protection directive’ adopted by the Working Part on 24 July 1998. 
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) 
4 Including Case C‑ 362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015 
5
 See relevant articles 45(3) and 93(2) of the GDPR for further information on the implementing acts 
Chapter 1: Some broad information in relation to the concept of adequacy  
 
Article 45, paragraph (1) of the GDPR sets out the principle that data transfers to a third country or 
international organization shall only take place if the third country, territory or one or more specified 
sectors within that third country or the international organization in question, ensures an adequate 
level of protection.  
 
This concept of “adequate level of protection” which already existed under Directive 95/46, has been 
further developed by the CJEU. At this point it is important to recall the standard set by the CJEU in 
Schrems, namely that while the "level of protection" in the third country must be "essentially 
equivalent" to that guaranteed in the EU, "the means to which that third country has recourse, in this 
connection, for the purpose of such a level of protection may differ from those employed within the 
[EU]"
6
. Therefore, the objective is not to mirror point by point the European legislation, but to establish 
the essential – core requirements of that legislation.  
 
The purpose of adequacy decisions by the European Commission is to formally confirm with binding 
effects on Member States
7
 that the level of data protection in a third country or an international 
organization is essentially equivalent to the level of data protection in the European Union
8
. Adequacy 
can be achieved through a combination of rights for the data subjects and obligations on those who 
process data, or who exercise control over such processing and supervision by independent bodies. 
However, data protection rules are only effective if they are enforceable and followed in practice. It is 
therefore necessary to consider not only the content of rules applicable to personal data transferred to 
a third country or an international organization, but also the system in place to ensure the 
effectiveness of such rules. Efficient enforcement mechanisms are of paramount importance to the 
effectiveness of data protection rules. 
  
Article 45, paragraph (2) of the GDPR, establishes the elements that the European Commission shall 
take into account when assessing the adequacy of the level of protection in a third country or 
international organization.  
 
For example, the Commission shall take into consideration the rule of law, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, the existence and effective functioning of one or more 
independent supervisory authorities and the international commitments the third country or 
international organization has entered into. 
 
It is therefore clear that any meaningful analysis of adequate protection must comprise the two basic 
elements: the content of the rules applicable and the means for ensuring their effective application. It 
is upon the European Commission to verify – on a regular basis - that the rules in place are effective in 
practice. 
 
The ‘core’ of data protection ‘content’ principles and ‘procedural/enforcement’ requirements, which 
could be seen as a minimum requirement for protection to be adequate, are derived from the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the GDPR. In addition, consideration should also be given to other 




Attention must also be paid to the legal framework for the access of public authorities to personal data. 
Further guidance on this is provided in Working paper 237 (i.e. the Essential Guarantees document)
10
 
on safeguards in the context of surveillance. 
 
General provisions regarding data protection and privacy in the third country are not sufficient. On the 
contrary, specific provisions addressing concrete needs for practically relevant aspects of the right to 
                                                          
6
 Case C‑ 362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015 (§§ 73, 74); 
7
 Article 288 (2) TFEU 
8
 Case C‑ 362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015 (§§ 52); 
9 Recital 105 of the GDPR 
10
 Working Document 01/2016 on the justification of interferences with the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection through surveillance measures when transferring personal data (European Essential Guarantees), 16/EN WP 237, 
13 April 2016 
data protection must be included in the third country’s or international organization’s legal framework. 
These provisions have to be enforceable. 
 
Chapter 2: Procedural aspects for adequacy findings under the GDPR  
 
For the EDPB to fulfil its task in advising the European Commission according to Article 70(1) (s) of 
the GDPR the EDPB should be provided with relevant documentation, including relevant 
correspondence and the findings made by the European Commission. Where the legal framework is 
complex, this should include any report prepared on the data protection level of the third country or 
international organization. In any case, the information provided by the European Commission should 
be exhaustive and put the EDPB in a position to make an own assessment regarding the level of data 
protection in the third country.   The EDPB will provide an opinion on the European Commission’s 
findings in due time and, identify insufficiencies in the adequacy framework, if any. The EDPB will also 
endeavor to propose alterations or amendments to address possible insufficiencies.  
 
According to Article 45 (4) of the GDPR it is upon the European Commission to monitor – on an 
ongoing basis - developments that could affect the functioning of an adequacy decision.  
 
Article 45 (3) of the GDPR provides that a periodic review must take place at least every four years. 
This is, however, a general time frame which must be adjusted to each third country or international 
organization with an adequacy decision. Depending on the particular circumstances at hand, a shorter 
review cycle could be warranted. Also, incidents or other information about or changes in the legal 
framework in the third country or international organization in question might trigger the need for a 
review ahead of schedule. It also appears to be appropriate to have a first review of an entirely new 
adequacy decision rather soon and gradually adjust the review cycle depending on the outcome.   
 
Given the mandate to provide the European Commission with an opinion on whether the third country, 
a territory or one or more specified sectors in this third country or an international organization, no 
longer ensures an adequate level of protection, the EDPB must, in due time, receive meaningful 
information regarding the monitoring of the relevant developments in that third country or international 
organization by the EU Commission. Hence, the EDPB should be kept informed of any review process 
and review mission in the third country or to the international organization. The EDPB would 
appreciate to be invited to participate in these review processes and missions. 
 
It should also be noted that according to article 45 (5) of the GDPR the European Commission has the 
right to repeal, amend or suspend existing adequacy decisions. The procedure to repeal, amend or 
suspend should consequently involve the EDPB by requesting its opinion pursuant art. 70(1) (s).  
 
Furthermore, as now recognized in article 58 (5) of the GDPR and according to the CJEU’s Schrems 
ruling, data protection authorities must be able to engage in legal proceedings if they find a claim by a 
person against an adequacy decision well founded: “It is incumbent upon the national legislature to 
provide for legal remedies enabling the national supervisory authority concerned to put forward the 
objections which it considers well founded before the national courts in order for them, if they share its 
doubts as to the validity of the Commission decision, to make a reference for a preliminary ruling for 
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 Case C‑ 362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015 (§ 65) 
Chapter 3: General Data Protection Principles to ensure that the level of protection in a third 
country, territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country or international 
organization is essentially equivalent to the one guaranteed by the EU legislation  
 
A third country’s or international organisation’s system must contain the following basic 
content and procedural/enforcement data protection principles and mechanisms:  
 
A. Content Principles: 
 
1) Concepts   
Basic data protection concepts and/or principles should exist. These do not have to mirror the GDPR 
terminology but should reflect and be consistent with the concepts enshrined in the European data 
protection law. By way of example, the GDPR includes the following important concepts: “personal 
data”, “processing of personal data”, “data controller”, “data processor", “recipient” and “sensitive 
data”.  
 
2) Grounds for lawful and fair processing for legitimate purposes 
 
Data must be processed in a lawful, fair and legitimate manner. 
The legitimate bases, under which personal data may be lawfully, fairly and legitimately processed 
should be set out in a sufficiently clear manner. The European framework acknowledges several such 
legitimate grounds including for example, provisions in national law, the consent of the data subject, 
performance of a contract or legitimate interest of the data controller or of a third party which does not 
override the interests of the individual. 
 
3) The purpose limitation principle  
 
Data should be processed for a specific purpose and subsequently used only insofar as this is not 
incompatible with the purpose of the processing. 
 
4) The data quality and proportionality principle 
 
Data should be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The data should be adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed. 
 
5) Data Retention principle 
 
Data should, as a general rule, be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the 
personal data is processed.  
 
6) The security and confidentiality principle 
 
Any entity processing personal data should ensure that the data are processed in a manner that 
ensures security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful 
processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or 
organisational measures.  The level of the security should take into consideration the state of the art 
and the related costs.  
 
 
7) The transparency principle 
 
Each individual should be informed of all the main elements of the processing of his/her personal data 
in a clear, easily accessible, concise, transparent and intelligible form. Such information should include 
the purpose of the processing, the identity of the data controller, the rights made available to him/her 
and other information insofar as this is necessary to ensure fairness. Under certain conditions, some 
exceptions to this right for information can exist, such as for example, to safeguard criminal 
investigations, national security, judicial independence and judicial proceedings or other important 
objectives of general public interest as is the case with Article 23 of the GDPR.   
 
8) The right of access, rectification, erasure and objection  
 
The data subject should have the right to obtain confirmation about whether or not data processing 
concerning him / her is taking place as well as access his/her data, including obtaining a copy of all 
data relating to him/her that are processed. 
The data subject should have the right to obtain rectification of his/her data as appropriate, for 
specified reasons, for example, where they are shown to be inaccurate or incomplete and erasure of 
his/her personal data when for example their processing is no longer necessary or unlawful.  
The data subject should also have the right to object on compelling legitimate grounds relating to 
his/her particular situation, at any time, to the processing of his/her data under specific conditions 
established in the third country legal framework. In the GDPR, for example, such conditions include 
when the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or 
when it is necessary for the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or when the 
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or a 
third party.  
The exercise of those rights should not be excessively cumbersome for the data subject. Possible 
restrictions to these rights could exist for example to safeguard criminal investigations, national 
security, judicial independence and judicial proceedings or other important objectives of general public 
interest as is the case with Article 23 of the GDPR. 
9) Restrictions on onward transfers 
Further transfers of the personal data by the initial recipient of the original data transfer should be 
permitted only where the further recipient (i.e. the recipient of the onward transfer) is also subject to 
rules (including contractual rules) affording an adequate level of protection and following the relevant 
instructions when processing data on the behalf of the data controller. The level of protection of 
natural persons whose data is transferred must not be undermined by the onward transfer. The initial 
recipient of the data transferred from the EU shall be liable to ensure that appropriate safeguards are 
provided for onward transfers of data in the absence of an adequacy decision. Such onward transfers 
of data should only take place for limited and specified purposes and as long as there is a legal 
ground for that processing.   
 
B. Examples of additional content principles to be applied to specific types of processing: 
 
1)  Special categories of data  
 
Specific safeguards should exist where ‘special categories of data are involved
12
. These categories 
should reflect those enshrined in Article 9 and 10 of the GDPR. This protection should be put in place, 
through more demanding  requirements for the data processing such as for example, that the data 
subject gives his/her explicit consent for the processing or through additional security measures. 
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 Such special categories are also known as “sensitive data” in recital 10 of the GDPR. 
 
 
2) Direct marketing 
  
Where data are processed for the purposes of direct marketing, the data subject should be able to 
object without any charge from having his/her data processed for such purposes at any time. 
 
3) Automated decision making and profiling  
 
Decisions based solely on automated processing (automated individual decision-making), including 
profiling, which produce legal effects or significantly affect the data subject, can take place only under 
certain conditions established in the third country legal framework. In the European framework, such 
conditions include, for example, the need to obtain the explicit consent of the data subject or the 
necessity of such a decision for the conclusion of a contract. If the decision does not comply with such 
conditions as laid down in the third country legal framework, the data subject should have the right not 
to be subject to it. The law of the third country should, in any case, provide for necessary safeguards, 
including the right to be informed about the specific reasons underlying the decision and the logic 
involved, to correct inaccurate or incomplete information, and to contest the decision where it has 
been adopted on an incorrect factual basis. 
 
C. Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms: 
 
Although the means to which the third country has recourse for the purpose of ensuring an 
adequate level of protection may differ from those employed within the European Union
13
, a 
system consistent with the European one must be characterized by the existence of the 
following elements: 
1) Competent Independent Supervisory Authority  
One or more independent supervisory authorities, tasked with monitoring, ensuring and enforcing 
compliance with data protection and privacy provisions in the third country should exist. The 
supervisory authority shall act with complete independence and impartiality in performing its duties 
and exercising its powers and in doing so shall neither seek nor accept instructions. In that context, 
the supervisory authority should have all the necessary and available powers and missions to ensure 
compliance with data protection rights and promote awareness. Consideration should also be given to 
the staff and budget of the supervisory authority.  The supervisory authority shall also be able, on its 
own initiative, to conduct investigations. 
2) The data protection system must ensure a good level of compliance 
 
A third country system should ensure a high degree of accountability and of awareness among data 
controllers and those processing personal data on their behalf of their obligations, tasks and 
responsibilities, and among data subjects of their rights and the means of exercising them. The 
existence of effective and dissuasive sanctions can play an important role in ensuring respect for 




A third country data protection framework should oblige data controllers and/or those processing 
personal data on their behalf  to comply with it and to be able to demonstrate such compliance in 
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 Case C‑ 362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015, para. 74. 
particular to the competent supervisory authority. Such measures may include for example data 
protection impact assessments, the keeping of records or log files of data processing activities for an 
appropriate period of time, the designation of a data protection officer or data protection by design and 
by default. 
4) The data protection system must provide support and help to individual data subjects 
in the exercise of their rights and appropriate redress mechanisms  
 
The individual should be able to pursue legal remedies to enforce his/her rights rapidly and effectively, 
and without prohibitive cost, as well as to ensure compliance. To do so there must be in place 
supervision mechanisms allowing for independent investigation of complaints and enabling any 
infringements of the right to data protection and respect for private life to be identified and punished in 
practice.  
Where rules are not complied with, the data subject should be provided as well with effective 
administrative and judicial redress, including for compensation for damages as a result of the unlawful 
processing of his/her personal data. This is a key element which must involve a system of independent 




Chapter 4: Essential guarantees in third countries for law enforcement and national security 
access to limit interferences to fundamental rights  
 
When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, under Art 45(2)(a) the Commission is 
required to take into account “relevant legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning 
public security, defence, national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to 
personal data as well as the implementation of such legislation…”. 
 
The CJEU in Schrems, noted that the “term ‘adequate level of protection’ must be understood as 
requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its international 
commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to 
that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the light of the Charter”. 
Even though the means to which that third country has recourse, in this connection, may differ from 





In this context, the court also noted critically that the previous Safe Harbor decision did “not contain 
any finding regarding the existence, in the United States, of rules adopted by the State intended to 
limit any interference with the fundamental rights of the persons whose data is transferred from the 
European Union to the United States, interference which the State entities of that country would be 
authorized to engage in when they pursue legitimate objectives, such as national security.” 
 
The WP29 has identified in the opinion WP237, adopted on 13 April 2016, essential guarantees 
reflecting the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECHR in the field of surveillance. While the 
recommendations detailed in WP237 remain valid and should be taken into account when assessing 
the adequacy of a third country in the field of surveillance, the application of these guarantees may 
differ in the fields of law enforcement and national security access to data. Still those four guarantees 
need to be respected for access to data, whether for national security purposes or for law enforcement 
purposes, by all third countries in order to be considered adequate:  
 
 
1) Processing should be based on clear, precise and accessible rules (legal basis)  
 
2) Necessity and proportionality with regards to legitimate objectives pursued need to be 
demonstrated  
 
3) The processing has to be subject to independent oversight  
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 See recital 74 of Case C-360/14 “Schrems” 
